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ABSTRACT

The Feminist Judgments Project (“FJP” or the “Project”) rewrites existing judicial
opinions from a feminist perspective. This article explores whether and how the
FJP’s alternative jurisprudence can influence future legal decisions. The FJP seeks
to change the law by revealing unconscious bias and opening judicial minds to
previously unknown perspectives - a method that draws on psychological theories of
decision making such as cultural cognition. This article takes a different approach
and evaluates the FJP using theories from political science. In light of the increasingly
conservative judiciary and the Republican administration, the attitudinal and
strategic theories of decision making would give the FJP little prospect of actually
influencing the law. Thus, this article focuses on historical institutionalism to present
a theoretical explanation for why and how the FJP’s re-envisioned law could possibly
persuade the judiciary. Specifically, the article examines the degree to which the
FJP draws on social facts highlighted by the #MeToo and LGBTQ rights movements
and whether the Project thereby creates the conditions for social construction and
resultant legal change. It also uses theories on displacement to present a critique
of the FJP’s more radical re-writes and points to the more moderate approach of
ideational salience amplification as effective. Ultimately, it concludes that the FJP’s
path of persuasion is somewhat narrow and limited, but possible.
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Persuasive or Pipe Dream? The Potential Influence of the Feminist Judgments
Project on Future Judical Decision Making

The purpose of the Feminist Judgments Project is to rewrite existing opinions
from a feminist perspective.1 The project is an international effort that originated
in Canada and the United Kingdom and has spread to the United States, Australia,
New Zealand, and India.2 The United States’ Feminist Judgment Project (“FJP” or
the “Project”)3 has issued two collections of opinions to date, Feminist Judgments:
Rewritten Opinions of the Supreme Court4 and Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax
Opinions,5 with many more collections planned and in progress.6 The FJP correctly
claims value in its own right regardless of its impact on the judiciary. For example,
one goal of the Project is simply to explore what feminist judging is, substantively
and rhetorically.7 The FJP tests which feminist theories have practical application
and which feminist methods are most workable within the limitations of judging.8
Another goal of the FJP is to reveal how seemingly neutral decision making is
not neutral.9 Ultimately, however, the FJP is more than theoretical; it also seeks
to create change, to affect the future development of the law in order “to achieve
gender justice in the outcomes of cases as well as in the process of judging.”10
The FJP asserts that it can achieve this change by opening minds, revealing
points or perspectives that the judiciary’s implicit biases shield from view.11 This
approach reflects theories of cultural cognition which posit that judicial decision
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E.g., Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to the
U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, in Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the
United States Supreme Court 5 (Kathryn M. Stanchi et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter
“Stanchi Introduction”].
Id.at 6-7; Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti, Introduction to the Feminist
Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions Project, in Feminist Judgments: Rewritten
Tax Opinions 3 (Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti eds., 2017) [hereinafter
“Crawford Introduction”]. See also Melinda Buckley, Women’s Court of Canada Act
and Rules, 8 Oñati Socio-Legal Series 1259, 1261 (2018); Feminist Judgments:
From Theory to Practice (Rosemary Hunter et al. eds., 2010); Australian Feminist
Judgments: Righting and Rewriting Law 1 (Heather Douglas et al. eds., 2014);
Feminist Judgments of Aotearoa New Zealand: Te Rino: A Two-Stranded Rope
(Elisabeth McDonald et al. eds., 2017); The Feminist Judgments Project: India,
https://fjpindia.wixsite.com/fjpi (last visited July 25, 2019).
U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, https://sites.temple.edu/usfeministjudgments/ (last
visited July 25, 2019).
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court
(Kathryn M. Stanchi et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter “Feminist Judgments”].
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions (Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C.
Infanti eds., 2017).
Series Projects, U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, https://sites.temple.edu/
usfeministjudgments/projects/ (last visited July 25, 2019) [hereinafter “Series Projects”].
Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 5.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 4 (“Although the project has a number of goals, one priority is to uncover that
what passes for neutral law making and objective legal reasoning is often bound up in
traditional assumptions and power hierarchies.”).
Linda L. Berger et al., Rewriting Judicial Opinions and the Feminist Scholarly Project,
94 Notre Dame L. Rev. Online 1, 2 (2018). See also Stanchi Introduction, supra note
1, at 5 (“If we can broaden the perspectives of the decision makers, change in the law is
possible.”).
Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 4-5.
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making is driven by psychological factors.12 According to this perspective, a judge’s
viewpoint is shaped by background and can be changed when the blinders of
experience are removed.13 This article, however, analyzes and critiques the FJP from
a different perspective. Instead of psychological theories, this article uses political
science models of judicial decision making to evaluate the potential persuasiveness
of the FJP’s alternative opinions and arguments. Political science scholarship is of
particular relevance because certain prominent political theories would find the FJP
to have no potential to influence the judiciary.14 These theorists present extensive
empirical evidence that judges are ideological decision makers.15 They assert that
the legal arguments, such as those offered by the FJP, do not persuade, but merely
act as cover for jurists’ pursuit of policy preference.16 In light of the challenge of
these ideological theories, and an increasingly conservative judiciary, this article
explores whether the field of political science universally condemns the FJP to
a purely intellectual exercise. As the following sections explain, one alternative
branch of political science, historical institutionalism, does offer a theoretical
argument for why and how the types of arguments made within the FJP opinions
could potentially persuade courts, regardless of ideology.17 This Article explores the
potential of this theory, and any supporting empirical evidence, to justify the utility
of the FJP for future persuasion. Ultimately, it concludes that the path of persuasion
is somewhat narrow and limited, but possible.
Part I of this Article details the history and substance of the FJP, identifying
the Project’s goals and methods and providing examples of the types of arguments
in the rewritten opinions. Part II explores the basics of the political science theories
that view judicial decision making as ideological and the contrasting theories of
historical institutionalism that find judges sometimes follow institutional norms
even when contrary to policy preference. Part III more specifically discusses
historical institutionalism theories on legal change and what type of arguments
are persuasive. Part IV applies historical institutionalism to the FJP and explores
which FJP arguments and cases most closely match historical institutionalism’s
theories of persuasion. Part V analyzes and critiques the application, exploring the
degree to which historical institutionalism offers a convincing argument for the
persuasiveness of the FJP. In this analysis, Part V identifies different categories of
argument within the FJP and their varied likelihoods of success.

12

13

14
15
16
17

Kate Webber, Families Are More Popular Than Feminism: Exploring the Greater
Judicial Success of Family and Medical Leave Laws, 32 Colum. J. Gender & L. 145,
167 (2016).
Id. at 167-68; see also Ann C. McGinley, Cognitive Illiberalism, Summary Judgment,
and Title VII: An Examination of Ricci v. DeStefano, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 865, 874
(2013); See, e.g., Paul Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism and Institutional Debiasing
Strategies, 49 San Diego L. Rev. 373, 387-394 (2012).
See infra Part II.
See id.
See id.
See infra Parts II & III.
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I. The Feminist Judgments Project: Critical Opinion Writing and the Hope to Persuade
The FJP takes existing judicial opinions and re-writes them from a feminist
perspective.18 The Project is spearheaded by editors Kathy Stanchi, Linda Berger and
Bridget Crawford,19 and has issued two collections: one consisting of twenty-seven
rewritten Supreme Court opinions20 and a second consisting of eleven rewritten
tax opinions from various courts and administrative bodies.21 In both collections,
each rewritten decision is paired with a separately authored commentary.22 The
FJP plans to issue at least six additional collections with rewritten opinions in the
following subject areas: reproductive justice, torts, corporations, trusts and estates,
employment discrimination, and family law.23
The inspiration for the FJP came from similar efforts to rewrite legal decisions,
first in Canada, and then the United Kingdom.24 A number of other common law
countries have either issued, begun, or are considering similar projects, including:
Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, and India.25 A feminist rewriting of international
law is also planned.26

A. Methods and Outcomes
Both the Supreme Court collection and tax decision collection of the FJP, as with all
of their sister projects, were limited in their ability to rewrite the law. 27 Specifically,
authors of the feminist opinions had to write as if bound by the law and facts as they

18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

26

27

Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 3; Crawford Introduction, supra note 2, at 3; U.S.
Feminist Judgments Project, supra note 3 (“The United States Feminist Judgments
Project is a collaborative effort of more than 100 feminist law professors to rewrite U.S.
legal decisions from a feminist perspective.”) .
U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, supra note 3.
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court, supra note 4.
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions, supra note 5.
See generally, Feminist Judgments, supra note 4; Feminist Judgments: Rewritten
Tax Opinions, supra note 5.
Series Projects, supra note 6.
Crawford Introduction, supra note 2, at 3. See Buckley, supra note 2, at 1261; Feminist
Judgments: From Theory to Practice, supra note 2.
Crawford Introduction, supra note 2, at 3. See Australian Feminist Judgments:
Righting and Rewriting Law 1, supra note 2; Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments:
Judges’ Troubles and the Gendered Politics of Identity (Mairead Enright et al.
eds., 2016); Feminist Judgments of Aotearoa New Zealand: Te Rino: A TwoStranded Rope, supra note 2; The Feminist Judgments Project: India, supra note 2.
Feminist International Judgments Project: Women’s Voices in International Law, U.
Leicester, https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/doctoralcollege/researchimages/2016competition/feminist-international-judgments-project-women2019s-voices-ininternational-law (last visited July 25, 2019).
Crawford Introduction, supra note 2, at 10 (“Authors were free to draw on their own
understandings and interpretations of feminist theories and methods, but they were
limited to rewriting their opinions based on the law and facts in existence at the time of
the original decision. This is a key feature of all the books in the Feminist Judgments
Series.”).

327

9 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2020)

existed at the time.28 Authors could expand on the facts presented in the opinion,
but only if those additional details were available in the record before the Court
or subject to judicial notice.29 The opinion authors were free to write reimagined
majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions.30 In the Supreme Court collection, the
opinion authors created fifteen new majority decisions, of which eight changed
the outcome and seven changed only the reasoning.31 This collection contained
four feminist concurrences, one partial concurrence/dissent, and five dissenting
opinions.32 The tax law collection contains seven rewritten majority opinions, two
dissents, one dissent in part and concurrence in part, and one concurrence.33

28
29
30
31

32

33

Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 10; Crawford Introduction, supra note 2, at 3.
E.g., Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 11.
Id. at 9; Crawford Introduction, supra note 2, at 10.
Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 13. The following opinions change the outcome
of the case. Laura Rosenbury, Griswold v. Connecticut, in Feminist Judgments, supra
note 4, at 103-113); Lucinda M. Finely, Geduldig v. Aiello, in Feminist Judgments,
supra note 4, at 190-207; Tracy A. Thomas, City of Los Angeles Department of Water &
Power v. Manhart, in Feminist Judgments, supra note 4, at 223-41; Leslie C. Griffin,
Harris v. McRae, in Feminist Judgments, supra note 4, at 247-56; David S. Cohen,
Rostker v. Goldberg, in Feminist Judgments, supra note 4, at 277-96; Lisa R. Pruitt,
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, in Feminist Judgments,
supra note 4, at 365-83; Ilene Durst, Nguyen v. INS, in Feminist Judgments, supra
note 4, at 473-84; Maria Isabel Medina, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, in Feminist
Judgments, supra note 4, at 508-526. The following cases change the reasoning. Teri
McMurtry-Chubb, Loving v. Virginia, in Feminist Judgments, supra note 4, at 119136; Dara E. Purvis, Frontiero v. Richardson, in Feminist Judgments, supra note 4,
at 173-84; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, in Feminist
Judgments, supra note 4, at 303-21; Deborah L. Rhode, Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, in Feminist Judgments, supra note 4, at 327-40; Ann C. McGinley, Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., in Feminist Judgments, supra note 4, at 414-25;
Ruthann Robson, Lawrence v. Texas, in Feminist Judgments, supra note 4, at 488-503;
Carlos A. Ball, Obergefell v. Hodges, in Feminist Judgments, supra note 4, at 532-546.
Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 13. The following decisions are concurrences. Karen
Syma Czapanskiy, Stanley v. Illinois, in Feminist Judgments, supra note 4, at 142-45;
Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Roe v. Wade, in Feminist Judgments, supra note 4, at 151-67
; Martha Chamallas, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in Feminist Judgments, supra note
4, at 345-60; Valorie K. Vojdik, United States v. Virginia, in Feminist Judgments, supra
note 4, at 389-407. The following opinions are dissents. Phyllis Goldfarb, Bradwell v.
Illinois, in Feminist Judgments, supra note 4, at 60-77; Pamela Lauder-Ukeles, Muller
v. Oregon, in Feminist Judgments, supra note 4, at 83-97; Cynthia Godsoe, Michel
M. v. Superior Court, in Feminist Judgments, supra note 4, at 262-71; Ann Bartow,
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, in Feminist Judgments, supra note
4, at 430-46; Aníbal Rosario Lebrón, United States v. Morrison, in Feminist Judgments,
supra note 4, at 452-67. See also Maria L. Ontiveros, Dothard v. Rawlinson, in Feminist
Judgments, supra note 4, at 213-27 (partial concurrence/dissent).
The following are majority opinions. Grant Christensen, United States v. Rickert, in
Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions, supra note 5, at 54-79; Mary Louise
Fellows, Welch v. Helvering, in Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions, supra
note 5, at 103-20; Mary L. Heen, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. United States,
in Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions, supra note 5, at 172-85; Danshera
Cords, Cheshire v. Commissioner, in Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions,
supra note 5, at 225-42; Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Magdalin v. Commissioner, in Feminist
Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions, supra note 5, at 253-65; David B. Cruz,
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The FJP calls on authors to rewrite the opinions from a feminist perspective,34
but allows each author to choose from the “multiplicity of theories, methods, and
approaches” within feminist legal theory.35 For example, in the FJP published to
date, some opinions reflect theories of formal equality, while others take an antisubordination or intersectionality approach.36 Opinion authors also use recognized
feminist methods, such as feminist practical reasoning and narrative feminist
method.37 As a result, the rewritten opinions have a wide variety of outcomes and
reasoning.
In some cases, the majority decision was re-envisioned to such a degree
that the new, imagined opinion had the opposite outcome to the original.38 For
example, in the rewritten majority opinion of Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,
Professor Maria Isabel Medina found that “the Colorado statute restricting law
enforcement’s discretion to refuse to enforce mandatory arrest restraining orders
created a property interest that entitles its holder to meaningful process under the
Due Process Clause.”39 This is directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s majority
opinion in the original decision.40 Despite the difference, Professor Medina based
her opinion on existing precedent and facts, relying on a broad interpretation of
Board of Regents v. Roth41 as well as reasoned consideration of the plain language

34
35
36
37
38

39
40
41

O’Donnabhaim v. Commissioner, in Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions,
supra note 5, at 274-96; Ruthann Robson, United States v. Windsor, in Feminist
Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions, supra note 5, at 306-16. The concurring opinion
rewrites the Bob Jones decision. David A. Brennen, Bob Jones University v. United
States, in Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions, supra note 5, at 150-63.
The dissents are as follows. Ann M. Murphy, Lucas v. Earl, in Feminist Judgments:
Rewritten Tax Opinions, supra note 5, at 89-94; Wendy C. Gerzog, Estate of Clack
v. Commissioner in Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions, supra note 5, at
195-214. See also Patricia A. Cain, United States v. Davis, in in Feminist Judgments:
Rewritten Tax Opinions, supra note 5, at 129-39 (dissenting in part concurring in
part). “Of the eleven rewritten cases in the [Tax FJP] book, six are Supreme Court
decisions, one is a federal circuit court opinion and four are Tax Court opinions.”
Crawford Introduction, supra note 2, at 10.
Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 9-11; Crawford Introduction, supra note 2, at 10.
Berger, supra note 10, at 2-3; see also Crawford Introduction, supra note 2, at 3 (“there
are no unitary feminist methods or reasoning processes”).
See Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 18-22.
See id. at 15-17.
E.g., Finely, supra note 31, at 199-200 (in rewritten Geduldig v. Aiello holding that a
pregnancy exclusion in the California Unemployment Insurance Code discriminates on
the basis of sex violating the Equal Protection Clause); Thomas, supra note 31, at 233
(in rewritten City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart awarding
retroactive damages after finding the retirement contribution plan violates Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Griffin, supra note 31, at 254 (in rewritten Harris v.
McRae, finding the Hyde Amendment, allowing federal defunding of abortion services
through Medicaid, violates equal protection under the Fifth Amendment); Cohen, supra
note 31, at 277 (in rewritten Rostker v. Goldberg holding that a male-only registration
violates equal protection under the Fifth Amendment); Durst, supra note 31, at 473 (in
rewritten Nguyen v. INS, finding section 1409(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
violates equal protection).
Medina, supra note 31, at 509.
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).
408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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and legislative history of the underlying Colorado statute.42 Professor Medina’s
traditional legal arguments were bolstered by a detailed factual immersion into
the reality of domestic violence. Using the feminist jurisprudential method of
narrative and contextualization,43 Professor Medina detailed the long history of
women’s legal subordination, the stereotypes beneath it, and how this led to a lack
of enforcement of protective orders against domestic abusers.44 She explained
the nationwide effort to combat these biases through mandated enforcement and
provided explicit description of the violence these laws were intended to mitigate.45
In other FJP cases, the identical outcome was bolstered by a reinvigorated
legal theory reflecting the insight of time and a critical analysis of the original
decision.46 As just one example, in the rewritten Roe v. Wade, Professor Kimberly
Mutcherson based the right to abortion not just on a right to privacy, the basis of
the original opinion,47 but also on due process and equal protection.48 Professor

42
43
44

45

46

47
48

Medina, supra note 31, at 518-523.
Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 15-16. This could also be considered a use of the
method of feminist practical reasoning. Id. at 15.
Patricia A. Broussard, Commentary on Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, in Feminist
Judgments: Supreme Court, supra note 4, at 507-508; Medina, supra note 31, at 50910.
Medina, supra note 31, at 510-12. The rewritten opinion of Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co. v. United States, is an example of this type of opposite outcome in the Tax
Law collection of the FJP. See Heen, supra note 33, at 181. In the feminist judgment,
Professor Heen rejected the original opinion’s conclusion that use of gender-based tables
to value reversionary interests was related to the important governmental objective of
promoting fairness and accurately valuing these interests. Id.
See Purvis, supra note 31, at 175 (applying strict scrutiny, instead of intermediate
scrutiny, to gender based classifications; Vojdik, supra note 32, at 390 (same); McMurtyChubb, supra note 31, at 122-23 (in rewritten United States v. Virginia, analyzing
Virginia’s statute barring interracial marriage beyond racial discrimination by looking
at Virginia’s history of white patriarchal influence on marriage to maintain “racialized
gender roles”); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 31, at 315, 319 (in rewritten Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, extending the reasonable person standard to that of a reasonable
person in the victim’s shoes in analyzing hostile environment harassment and applying
strict liability, no longer requiring notice of the alleged misconduct to the employer,
when supervisory personnel engage in sexual harassment); McGinley, supra note 31,
at 418, 420-21 (in rewritten Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., redefining
the “because of sex” standard of harassment to include situations where victims do
not conform gender roles or stereotypes and by shifting the burden on the defendant to
prove if the behavior occurred because of sex); Czapanskiy, supra note 32, at 142-43 (in
rewritten Stanley v. Illinois restricting the level of due process owed to a parent to reflect
the relationship between the parent and child thereby not extending due process rights
to parents only because they are mothers or married). An example of this approach in
the Tax FJP is the rewritten O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner. Cruz, supra note 33. In
the feminist judgment of this case, the result is nearly identical but the reasoning moves
away from characterizing the transgender taxpayer has having a ‘disorder,’ offering
a less “pathologized” interpretation of the Treasury Regulations to allow a medical
deduction for the taxpayer’s gender conforming surgery. Nancy J. Knauer, Commentary
on O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner, Feminist Judgments: Tax Opinions, supra note 5,
at 272-73; Cruz, supra note 33, at 286-88.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
Rachel Rebouché, Commentary on Roe v. Wade, in Feminist Judgments: Supreme
Court, supra note 4, at 147; Mutcherson, supra note 32, at 153-54.
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Mutcherson further rejected the trimester framework and established a strict
scrutiny test for any state effort to restrict access to abortion.49 Mutcherson adopted
the argument of a number of scholars that limitations on abortion depend on gender
stereotypes about women’s “inherent” nature as mothers.50 Thus, Mutcherson used
the classic feminist legal method of “asking the woman question,”51 delving into the
effect of abortion restriction laws that reinforce gender inequality.52 By doing so,
Mutcherson explored the equal protection implications of abortion rights.53
Finally, in a number of important decisions, the feminist perspective led to
a ringing dissent, looking to future legal change for the adoption of the author’s
viewpoint.54 For example, in the feminist judgment of United States v. Morrison,
Professor Aníbal Rosario Lebrón wrote a dissenting opinion challenging the
original opinion’s holding that the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) exceeded
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.55 Applying narrative feminist
method—and in sharp contrast to the brief and euphemistic references in the
original case—Professor Rosario Lebrón’s dissent provided explicit detail of the
underlying case, including the rapist’s “debasing remarks about what he liked to do
with women.”56 Rosario Lebrón drew on earlier Commence Clause precedents to
focus on the burden and effect upon interstate commerce, rather than recent trends
that analyze the source of the commerce, and used congressional findings to detail
the ways gender violence acted as “a form of economic domination.”57 Rosario
Lebrón also made the novel argument that the VAWA was a means to comply with
the United States’ obligations under international law, specifically the International

49
50
51
52
53
54

55

56
57

Rebouché, supra note 48, at 147; Mutcherson, supra note 32, at 157.
Rebouché, supra note 48, at 148; Mutcherson, supra note 32, at 163.
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 837 (1990).
Rebouché, supra note 48, at 148; Mutcherson, supra note 32, at 162-66.
Mutcherson, supra note 32, at 162-63.
Goldfarb, supra note 32, at 60 (rewritten Bradwell v. Illinois); Lauder-Okeles, supra
note 32, at 83 (rewritten Muller v. Oregon); Godsoe, supra note 32, at 262 (rewritten
Michael M. v. Superior Court); Bartow, supra note 32, at 430 (rewritten Gebser v. Lago
Vista Independent Scholl District); and Lebrón, supra note 32, at 452 (rewritten United
States v. Morrison). The feminist judgment in the Estate of Clack v. Commissioner,
is an example of a dissenting opinion in the Tax FJP. Gerzog, supra note 33. In the
feminist dissent, Professor Wendy Gerzog challenges the original opinion’s holding that
an executor has the discretion “to elect QTIP treatment, and possibly divest the surviving
spouse of a property interest, qualified for the marital deduction pursuant to [Internal
Revenue] Code § 2056(b)(7).” Goldburn P. Maynard Jr., Commentary on Estate of Clack
v. Commissioner, in Feminist Judgments: Tax Opinions, supra note 5, at 188; Gerzog,
supra note 33, at 207-14. Professor Gerzog uncovers the stereotypes underlying to
original opinion and focuses on the disparate harmful effect of the decision on widows.
Maynard, supra at 188; Gerzog, supra note 33, at 209-10. Professor Gerzog further
critiques the original opinion for an unduly narrow interpretation of the underlying law
and disregard for established understandings of the Internal Revenue Code. Maynard,
supra at 188; Gerzog, supra note 33, at 201-203.
Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Commentary on United States v. Morrison, in Feminist
Judgments: Supreme Court, supra note 4, at 447; Lebrón, supra note 32, at 452-53
(rewritten United States v. Morrison).
Sanders, supra note 55 at 447; Lebrón, supra note 32, at 453-56 (rewritten United States
v. Morrison).
Sanders, supra note 55, at 448-49; Lebrón, supra note 32, at 458-62 (rewritten United
States v. Morrison)..
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which calls on signatories to
combat gender-motivated violence.58

B. Goals and Assumptions
One goal of the FJP is “[t]o make the point that law may be driven by perspective
as much as stare decisis.”59 The FJP seeks to demonstrate that a “more complex
and contextualized vantage” would lead to a different decision making process.60
The FJP is based on the premise that decision makers are profoundly influenced
by “subjective (and often unconscious) beliefs and assumptions,” that “reinforce
traditional or familiar approaches,” and that these underlying influences generate
the systemic inequalities within the law.61 Indeed, according to the FJP, “all decision
making involves a situated perspective … affected by assumptions and expectations
of norms relating to gender, race, class, sexuality, and other characteristics.”62 The
FJP’s goal then, is to shed light on these underlying biases, and challenge the myth
that judges are neutral actors who merely apply the law.63 The FJP asserts that by
highlighting these subjective, situated influences, the Project creates the conditions
for avoiding that influence, and thus, for changing the law.64
This stated premise of the FJP draws on the concepts of cultural cognition, a
psychology- based theory of judicial decision making which asserts that unconscious
cultural and cognitive forces subconsciously affect judges.65 Cultural cognition
recognizes that people process information in a manner that supports their existing
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Sanders, supra note 55, at 451; Lebrón, supra note 32, at 465-66 (rewritten United States
v. Morrison).
Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 10.
Id. at 9. See also Linda L. Berger et al., Method, Impact, and Reach of the Global Feminist
Judgments Projects, 8 Oñati Socio-Legal Series 1215, 1218 (2018) (“The signature
achievement of the FJPs has been to demonstrate that judicial decision making is rarely
detached from personal background and experience and that judicial interpretation is
never purely neutral and objective.”).
Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 5.
Id.at 4-5.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5; Berger, supra note 10, at 2. The FJP looks to have an influence beyond judicial
decision makers. It also speaks to lawyers, to show feminist advocates how to ‘use
law to persuade and produce social change.” Id. See also Gillian Thomas, Feminist
Judgments and Women’s Rights at Work, 94 Notre Dame L. Rev. Online 12 (2018)
(the FJP “overarching thought experiment also offers invaluable lessons to today’s
practitioners… whom must tell clients’ stories”). Students are also beneficiaries of the
various feminist judgment projects. Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 4-6 (noting
the important “educational function” of the Supreme Court FJP); see also Berger et al.,
supra note 60, at 1218 (noting how the projects have proved their value as teaching tools
and have inspired students).
Webber, supra note 12, at 167 (citing Paul Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism and
Institutional Debiasing Strategies, 49 San Diego L. Rev. 373, 374 (2012); Sidney
A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Politicized Judicial Review in Administrative Law:
Three Improbable Responses, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 319, 337 (2012); Paul Secunda,
Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 107, 108-109 (2010)). See also Ann
C. McGinley, Cognitive Illiberalism, Summary Judgment, and Title VII: An Examination
of Ricci v. Destefano, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 865, 874 (2013).
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viewpoint; overlooking information that is inconsistent with their values and overvaluing
facts that support it.66 When judges bring their own cultural perspective to a case,
this type of processing results in biased decision making, a result termed “cognitive
illiberalism.”67 According to cultural cognition theory, this is unconscious, and judges
sincerely believe they are applying the law neutrally, without deliberate reference to
their ideological beliefs.68 Consequently, those who adopt cultural cognition theory,
and its related concepts of implicit bias, look to solutions via exposure, education,
and conscious de-biasing techniques such as deliberately considering other points of
view.69 According to theories of cultural cognition, by training decision makers on the
influence of these biases and teaching them to use their conscious mind to counteract
them, biases in decisions can be reduced or eliminated.70
As noted above, the FJP appears to adopt this approach to understanding
the origin of biased decision making and what are the potential solutions. In
particular, many71 of the rewritten opinions in the FJP seek to create legal change
by offering new factual details omitted from or incompletely considered in the
original opinions.72 This is consistent with the premise of cultural cognition that
biases causes decision makers to unconsciously disregard facts that are inconsistent
with their viewpoint, and the proposed solution of consciously examining the
previously unconsidered perspective.73 For example, in her rewritten opinion of
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, Professor Onwauchi-Willig revised the legal
standard for sexual harassment to analyze the work environment, not from a
reasonable person standard, but from the perspective of a “reasonable victim in the
complainant’s shoes.”74 In crafting this standard, Onwauchi-Willig emphasized the
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Webber, supra note 12, at 167 (citing Secunda, Cognitive, supra note 65, at 380-81;
Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 65, at 337).
Id. at 168.
Id. at 167-68; See also McGinley, supra note 65, at 874.
See, e.g., Secunda, supra note 65, at 387-94.
Id. at 387-88.
See Goldfarb, supra note 32 (written Bradwell v. Illinois); Doneff & Lauder-Ukeles, supra
note 32 (rewritten Muller v. Oregon); McMurty-Chubb, supra note 31 (rewritten Loving
v. Virginia); Finely, supra note 31 (rewritten Geduldig v. Aiello); Cohen, supra note
31 (rewritten Rostker v. Goldberg); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 31 (rewritten Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson); Rhode, supra note 31 (rewritten Johnson v. Transportation
Agency); Pruitt, supra note 31 (rewritten Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey); Vojdik, supra note 32 (rewritten United States v. Virginia);
McGinley, supra note 31 (rewritten Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.); Bartow,
supra note 32 (rewritten Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District); Lebrón,
supra note 32 (rewritten United States v. Morrison); Durst, supra note 31 (rewritten
Nguyen v. INS); Medina, supra note 31 (rewritten Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales). See
also Murphy, supra note 33, at 89-94 (rewritten Lucas v. Earl); Cain, supra note 33, at
129-29 (rewritten United States v. Davis); Brennen, supra note 33, at 150-63 (rewritten
Bob Jones University); Heen, supra note 33, at 172-85 (rewritten Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co.); Cruz, supra note 33, at 274-96 (rewritten O’Donnabhaim v. Commissioner);
Robson, supra note 33, at 306-16 (rewritten United States v. Windsor).
See Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 15-16 (describing narrative feminist method).
See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
Kristen Konrad Tiscione, Commentary on Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, in Feminist
Judgments: Supreme Court, supra note 4, at 301; Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 31, at
309-12.
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factual circumstances of the plaintiff, a single woman with limited education who is
dependent on her job to support her family, noting women are more likely than men
to view conduct as harassment and some are less likely to resist or complain given
vulnerable economic circumstances.75 Onwauchi-Willig went on to change the legal
standard and hold employers strictly liable for sexual harassment by supervisors;
again emphasizing the facts of worker vulnerability and the need to earn a living in
contrast to the employer’s superior ability to control a supervisor harasser.76

II. Political Science and the FJP: Can the Project Persuade?
Although the FJP’s approach is consistent with theories of cultural cognition,
other theories of judicial decision making pose a direct challenge to the Project’s
goal of influencing future decisions.77 Specifically, political science has a long
standing, empirically supported, body of research and theory asserting that judges,
particularly the justices of the Supreme Court, make decisions based on ideological
preferences.78 Under these theories of decision making, the FJP’s offer of new
persuasive arguments is for naught unless feminist-minded judges are deciding the
matter. The sections below explore this challenge and ask whether political science
theories universally condemn the FJP to existence as an intellectual exercise in light
of the number of conservative jurists currently on the bench.79 Ultimately, although
certain theories undermine the utility of the FJP, one line of thought, the theory of
historical institutionalism, does find a role for legal persuasion and offers support
for the Project’s goal of inspiring change through novel reconstructions of the law.

A. The Problem of the Ideological Models
It is a common belief that judges, particularly the justices of the Supreme Court,
are political, meaning they decide cases based on ideological preferences, not
based on neutral application of the law.80 A number of political science scholars
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Tiscione, supra note 74, at 301, Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 31, at 312.
Tiscione, supra note 74, at 302; Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 31, at 319-21.
Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 5 (“[i]f we can broaden the perspectives of the
decision makers, change in the law is possible”); Berger, supra note 10, at 2 (“In the form
of rewritten opinions based on the facts and precedent in effect at the time of the original
decisions, these projects demonstrate that judges who apply feminist perspectives would
make a profound difference, not only in the outcomes and processes in individual cases,
but also in the development of the law”).
Webber, supra note 12, at 158; See also Julie Novkov, Understanding Law As A
Democratic Institution Through Us Constitutional Development, 40 Law & Soc. Inquiry
811, 814 (2015).
See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan, Trump is Putting Indelible Conservative Stamp on Judiciary,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 2018, at A15.
E.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Bars Challenges to Partisan Gerrymandering, N.Y.
Times (June 27, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/politics/supreme-courtgerrymandering.html (describing the addition of conservative Brett Kavanaugh to the
court as contributing to the outcome); Lucia Manzi & Matthew E.K. Hall, Friends You
Can Trust: A Signaling Theory of Interest Group Litigation Before the U.S. Supreme
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have empirically tested this general view and find that ideology does determine
judicial outcomes.81 The notion that ideology drives decisions is usually termed
the attitudinal model of judicial decision making.82 The attitudinal model can be
paired with the strategic model, which also asserts that judges engage in ideological
decision making, but adds a constraint.83 Specifically, the strategic model claims
that judges want to make ideology based decisions but are confined in their ability
to do so by other political forces, such as the potential for reversal, or in the case
of the Supreme Court, legislative override or even impeachment.84 Consequently,
the strategic model states that judges will only vote as ideologically as possible,
modifying their preferred position to stay below the partisan level of voting that
could result in that type of backlash.85
These political science theories pose a challenge to the FJP. If judges are
ideological decision makers, no amount of creative or persuasive arguments will
alter the legal outcomes. The only real recourse would be political action, the
election of a president who would appoint feminist minded judges and justices and
the election of feminist minded legislators who might provide strategic incentive
for the courts to be less hostile to feminist legal goals. If these theories are the
correct understanding of how the courts work, the FJP is merely academic, and the
time invested in the Project is perhaps better spent in the political arena.
The field of political science, however, does not monolithically limit the FJP
to a thought exercise. A number of political science scholars counter the ideological
theories and offer alternative theories on how and why the law does matter to,
and constrain, judges.86 These alternative theories create the possibility that legal
arguments, such as those offered by the FJP, can influence judges. In particular, the
principles of “historical institutionalism” explain how judges, including Supreme
Court justices, are limited by the institutional norms of the judiciary, including,
for example, an obligation to apply precedents and consider certain legal values.87
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Court, 51 Law & Soc’y Rev. 704, 729-30 (2017) (describing how amicus briefs influence
justices of similar ideology); Neal Devins, Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party
Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. 301,
302 (2016) (describing ideological divide in the Supreme Court tied to party affiliation
of appointing president).
Webber, supra note 12 at 158; See also Novkov, supra note 78, at 814.
Webber, supra note 12, at 158. See also Lee Epstein et al., The Behavior of Federal
Judges 69 (2013); Richard L. Pacelle, Jr. et al., Decision Making by the Modern
Supreme Court 34-36 (2011); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold Spaeth, The Attitudinal
Model Revisited 86 (2002).
E.g., Mario Bergara et al., Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The
Congressional Constraint, 28 Legis. Stud. Q. 247, 267 (2003).
Webber, supra note 12, at 158; Michael A. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, The
Constrained Court 97-101 (2011). Pacelle, Jr. et al, supra note 82, at 39-45.
Novkov, supra note 78, at 814-15.
Webber, supra note 12, at 158; Bailey & Maltzman, supra note 84, at 97-101; Pacelle,
Jr. et al, supra note 82, at 39-45.
Webber, supra note 12, at 158-59 (describing the integrated model of judicial decision
making that asserts judges “are ideological in part, but also modify their decisions based
on … a respect for legal principles such as precedent”) (citing Bailey & Maltzman ,
supra note 84, at 73,78; Pacelle, Jr. et al, supra note 82, at 51-52).
E.g., Ronald Kahn, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Decision-Making: The
Rehnquist Court on Privacy and Religion, in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New
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As described in Section B below, according to this theory, institutional constraints
prevent courts from acting as solely partisan decision makers.88

B. Historical Institutionalism: Theory
Historical institutionalism is a model for the behavior of political actors, including
the judiciary.89 The basic premise of this model is that institutions, their norms,
expectations and historical practices, confine and restrain decision makers.90 In
the judicial context, historical institutionalism contends that judges act within a
set of internalized constraints such as “a sense of duty or obligation about their
responsibilities to the law and the Constitution and by a commitment to act as
judges rather than as legislators or executives.”91 Thus, courts, and the Supreme
Court in particular, are unique among the three political branches, in that they are
bound by certain legal practices and are not free to solely pursue their preferred
ideological outcomes.92 To maintain their legitimacy, the courts must at least appear
to be bound by the law; this limits the ability of judges to act in a wholly partisan
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Institutionalist Approaches 175, 175-76 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman
eds., 1999).
E.g., Kahn, Institutional Norms, supra note 87, at 175-76 .
E.g. id. at 3 ; Marcella Marlowe, Jurisprudential Regimes: The Supreme Court,
Civil Rights, and the Life Cycle of Judicial Doctrine 11 (2011). Historical
institutionalism is sometimes termed new institutionalism. See e.g. Marlowe, supra
at 11; Rogers M. Smith, Historical Institutionalism and the Study of Law, in The
Oxford Handbook Of Law And Politics 48 (Gregory A. Caldeira et al. eds. 2008)
(describing how public law scholars critical of behavioralism identified themselves first
as new institutionalist and then as historical institutionalists). Regardless of terminology,
this institutionalist theory falls within the broader umbrella of American Political
Development. Marlowe, supra at 27-31; Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch, Introduction, in
The Supreme Court And American Political Development13-16 (2006). Historical
institutionalism can be distinguished from “rational choice institutionalism.” Kahn &
Kersch, supra at 5; Smith, supra at 47-48. Rational choice institutionalism maintains
the premise that judges seek to implement their policy views into the law but sometimes
cannot do so due to institutional forces such as Congress overturning a court’s statutory
interpretation. Kahn & Kersch, supra at 5. Thus, the strategic model does accept some
institutional premises. Id. Historical institutionalism, in contrast, views institutional
forces not just as obstacles to ideological decision making, but rather, shaping decision
making itself. Smith, supra at 47-48.
E.g., Kahn, Institutional Norms, supra note 89, at 4-5. Novkov, supra note 78, at
820 (noting the “fundamental historical institutional insight that legal decision making,
even when it is responsive to political concerns, takes place within the available legal
discursive frameworks of the jurisprudential moment in which it occurs”) (citing
Pamela Brandwein, Rethinking the Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction
(2011); Kenneth Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties: Discontinuities in the
Development of American Constitutional Law (2004)).
Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes: Institutional
Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in Supreme Court Decision-Making:
New Institutionalist Approaches 1, 5 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds.,
1999). See also Marlowe, supra note 89, at 11-12; Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at
17-18.
Marlowe, supra note 89, at 12.
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manner.93 Historical institutionalism does not completely reject the attitudinal
premise that political preferences affect judicial decisions, acknowledging that
such preferences play a role.94 Rather, this model provides an explanation of the
circumstances under which judges must subordinate their ideological preferences
in order to serve institutional norms, including respect for the law.95
For example, historical institutionalist scholar Professor Ronald Kahn examined
landmark religion cases during the Rehnquist Court and concluded that its justices
did not “follow election returns, the policies of the presidents who appointed them,
or even personal policy wants … institutional norms, including the following of
precedent, or stare decisis; respect for the difference between law and politics; and
concerns for institutional legitimacy inform[ed] Court decision-making in important
ways.”96 As Kahn explained, if the Supreme Court of that era had followed personal
policy preferences, it would have rejected precedents regarding state establishment
and free exercise of religion.97 At the time, conservative scholars and politicians
sought to replace the Establishment Clause test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman
with what is called a coercion test, and which would allow greater state support of
religion.98 The Rehnquist Court, however, rejected the coercion test and kept “the
central premise of the Lemon test.”99 As Kahn explains, these decisions, which were
contrary to conservative ideology, reflected the constraining effect of institutional
principles, specifically, the duty to follow established precedents and the normative
value of a Court’s “autonomy from politics.”100
The evidence in support of historical institutionalism is often qualitative,
consisting of deep analysis of the context and content of Supreme Court decisions
and locating institutional influences at work.101 Yet the proponents of this approach
offer it as an alternative to the ideological models of analysis,102 which are based
on empirical studies.103 Given the challenge that these theories pose to the utility
of the FJP, explained above, it is important to examine what empirical evidence
exists in support of the historical institutionalist claim that law matters. Fortunately,
statistical analysis supporting the institutionalist position is available, including
recent studies confirming the role of law in decisions.
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Id. at 11-13; Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 17-18.
Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game), in New
Institutionalist Approaches 65, 86 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds.,
1999), 180; Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 14; Novkov, supra note 78, at 815-16.
Kahn, supra note 87, at 180; Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 14.
Kahn, supra note 87, at 177.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 186.
Id. (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)).
Id.
Marlowe, supra note 89, at 23; Ronald Kahn, The Commerce Clause and Executive
Power: Exploring Nascent Individual Rights in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, 73 Md. L. Rev. 133, 143 (2013).
Kahn, supra note 87, at 175-77.
E.g., Kate Webber, It Is Political: Using the Models of Judicial Decision Making to
Explain the Ideological History of Title VII, 89 St. John’s L. Rev. 841, 860-61 (2015).
Kahn critiques this reliance as being based on the assumption that the Court’s decision
making is based on external factors such as ideology and ignores internal institutional
and precedential factors. Kahn, supra note 101, at 143.
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C. Empirical Support for the Relevance of the Law
Mark Richards and Herbert Kritzer provided one of the seminal statistical studies
establishing the law’s influence on the Supreme Court.104 Their study examined the
influence of “jurisprudential regimes” which “structure Supreme Court decision
making by establishing which case factors are relevant for decision making and/
or by setting the level of scrutiny or balancing the justices are to employ … .”105
Richards and Kritzer applied statistical tests using logistic regression to examine
“all cases from 1953 to 1998 that presented a free press, free expression, or free
speech issue.”106 Although acknowledging that policy goals influence Supreme
Court decision making, their study concludes that the Court “is not simply a
small legislature - [l]aw matters in Supreme Court decision making” as well.107
Specifically, they found that jurisprudential regimes did structure the justices’
decisions, regardless of ideology.108
This study is consistent with Kahn’s historical institutional analysis of the
survival of the Lemon test in the Rehnquist Court described above. In fact, in
a subsequent study, Richards and Kritzer performed a statistical analysis of the
impact of Lemon v. Kurtzman on a series of subsequent Establishment Clause
decisions.109 Their analysis concluded that although Lemon did not directly dictate
specific outcomes, and justices did not always follow the decision, the Lemon test
“acted as a framework for the decisions in Establishment Clause cases decided over
the last 30 years.”110 Thus, Richards and Kritzer explain, “law does matter” to the
Supreme Court by setting the parameters for deciding cases.111
In another example, to test the hypotheses “that justices’ voting behavior is
influenced by their desire to reach legally sound decisions,” Stefanie Lindquist and
David Klein studied 338 cases in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve a circuit split.112 Their statistical analysis revealed “strong evidence that
jurisprudential influences matter for justices’ decisions in [circuit] conflicts cases.”113
Specifically, they found that the greater the number of circuits in favor of a position, the
more likely justices were to adopt that position.114 As Lindquist and Klein explained,
this indicated a number of possible jurisprudential influences: for example, that with
more circuit court opinions there were more chances that at least one court hit upon
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Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court
Decision Making, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 305 (2002).
Id. at 305.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 315.
Id. Contra Marlowe, supra note 89, at 22 (describing evidence that “undercuts the
efficacy” of the Kritzer and Richards results).
Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J. Richards, Jurisprudential Regimes and Supreme Court
Decisionmaking: The Lemon Regime and Establishment Clause Cases, 37 Law & Soc’y
Rev. 827, 828-31 (2003).
Id. at 831, 839.
Id. at 839.
Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations
on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 Law & Soc’y Rev.
135, 144 (2006).
Id. at 151.
Id. at 142, 151-52.
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a persuasive legal argument or the winning position gained more supporting circuit
court positions because it had “greater legal plausibility and justices tend to choose
the more plausible position.”115 The study also found that justices were less likely
to side with an argument that generated more dissenting and concurring opinions
in the circuit court decisions.116 Again this indicated jurisprudential influences on
the Supreme Court: “[d]issenting opinions typically identify faults in the majority’s
legal analysis, thus undermining its persuasiveness.”117
This study also established that the more prestigious the circuit court, the more
likely the Supreme Court would adopt its position, likely due to the fact that circuit
courts are prestigious for their superior legal reasoning.118 Finally, Lindquist and
Klein found that the position taken by the Solicitor General was, under certain
circumstances, more likely to be adopted by the Supreme Court, and that this could
indeed be due to the expertise in that office of crafting persuasive legal arguments.119
Thus, overall, based on their empirical study and statistical analysis, Lindquist and
Klein conclude that although justices’ personal values affect their decisions, the
“results strongly support the view that judges and justices [also] engage in sincere
efforts to find solutions that are persuasive according to a commonly held set of
criteria.”120
More recent empirical studies bolster the evidence of legal influences on
decisions making. For example, Michael Bailey and Forrest Maltzman tested the
effects of three legal factors: precedent, deference to Congress, and “the sanctity of
the First Amendment’s free speech clause,”121 in Supreme Court cases from 1951
through 2008.122 They found “strong evidence that legal principles are influential
for the decisions made by most justices.”123 In a different study, Richard Pacelle,
Jr., Brett Curry, and Bryan Marshall performed a statistical analysis of the Supreme
Court’s economic and civil liberties cases from the 1953-2000 terms to examine
the influences of ideology and existing precedents.124 Although the study found
that justices’ policy preferences play a significant role, it also found that the “Court
pays attention to precedent and seeks to establish consistency in the law….”125 They
specifically note the consistency of their findings with Richards and Kritzter’s 2002
study on the influence of jurisprudential regimes.126 Thus, empirical studies support
the assertion by historical institutionalists that the law acts as a constraining force
on judicial decision making.
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Id. at 151-52.
Id. at 143, 153-54.
Lindquist & Klein, supra note 112, at 153.
Id. at 154-55. According to Lindquist and Klein, this explanation is the most likely given
prior studies that show prestige of circuit courts is unrelated to ideology. Id. at 154.
Id. at 144, 155-56. Lindquist and Klein note that on this factor, their tests were not
conclusive, but still concluded, “we think it highly likely that jurisprudential and/or
institutional considerations account for some of the SG’s success in conflict cases.” Id.
at 156.
Id. at 156.
Bailey & Maltzman, supra note 84, at 70.
Id. at 70
Id. at 78.
Pacelle, Jr. et al, supra note 82, at 61.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 203.
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D. Implications for the FJP
The first impact of historical institutionalism on the FJP is to offer some validation to
the Project’s goals. By rejecting the premise that judges only engage in ideological
decision making, and giving law at least some role, historical institutionalism
justifies the effort to craft legal arguments to persuade the courts, as the FJP does.
Indeed, in many ways, the FJP works within the bounds of institutional theory.
Specifically, the FJP only works with existing law.127 The Project does not assume
a constitution with an Equal Rights Amendment; it does not rely on imaginary
statutes; and it does not create new facts that did not exist at the time of the
various decisions.128 Instead, all rewritten opinions in the FJP must use the law as
it existed at the time and the facts available either in the record or through judicial
notice.129 In this manner, the FJP implicitly accepts and works with the historical
institutionalist premise that the judiciary as an institution is bound by certain norms
such as precedent.
The FJP, however, also has a seemingly contradictory premise. Although
each opinion is bound by the law at the time, each opinion is new, changing the
precedent it is based on and offering a different type of argument in that case. By
rewriting existing precedents, the FJP attempts to show that even within confines of
existing law and fact, a different outcome or legal reasoning was, and is, possible.130
These changes in prior cases, create a model for deciding future cases in a similarly
reinvented manner. Thus, the FJP ultimately seeks to change the law.131 Historical
institutionalism’s basic premise, that institutional norms such as precedent confine
judges,132 seems to suggest more continuity rather than change. Indeed, the Richards
and Kritzer results suggest the stability of the law via jurisprudential regimes.133
Historical institutionalist works have addressed this issue, however. As described
below, historical institutionalism theory offers detailed explanations on how change
is possible even within institutional confines.134
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E.g., Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 10.
Id. at 10-11; Crawford Introduction, supra note 2, at 3. Nor does the FJP assume a
different bench of justices; many opinions were written as dissents in acknowledgment
of that their arguments would not have been adopted by a majority at the time of the
decision. Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 9-11; Crawford Introduction, supra note
2, at 10.
E.g., Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 10.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 5. “Through this project, we hope to show that systemic inequalities are not intrinsic
to law, but rather may be rooted in the subjective (and often unconscious) beliefs and
assumptions of the decision makers. These inequalities may derive from processes and
influences that tend to reinforce traditional or familiar approaches, decisions, or values.
In other words, if we can broaden the perspectives of the decision makers, change in the
law is possible.” Id.
E.g., Kahn, supra note 87, at 177.
E.g., Kritzer, supra note 109, at 831, 839 (noting that “the Lemon regime acted as a
framework for the decisions in Establishment Clause cases decided over the last 30
years.”).
See Novkov, supra note 78, at 820-22 (explaining how institutionalism enables scholars
to theorize above change in law over time).
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III. Changing the Law: Historical Institutionalist Theories
As explained above, the institutional theory of decision making asserts that to
achieve legitimacy, courts cannot decide cases based solely on politics or personal
policy preferences, but must comply with precedent and other institutional
norms.”135 The meaning or application of those institutional principles, however,
can change in light of social, economic, and political changes in the outside
world.136 Thus, according to some institutionalists, a necessary additional premise
of institutionalism is that to sustain the legitimacy of the judiciary, the law cannot
remain stagnant; courts, particularly the Supreme Court, must “interpret principles
and precedents in light of what they mean as applied in a changing society.” 137 As
a result, as Kahn explains, the Supreme Court’s decision making process is both
internal, governed by institutional concerns such as that law itself or judicial norms
and procedures, and external, influenced by a changing social reality.138 Professor
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Kahn, supra note 87, at 178. See also Ronald Kahn, Why Does a Moderate/Conservative
Supreme Court in a Conservative Age Expand Gay Rights?, in Constitutional Politics
in a Conservative Era 173, 189-90 (Austin Sarat ed., 2008)(“The presence of constituting
institutional norms and practices means that Supreme Court rulings have objectivity and
are independent of individual subjective policy opinions held by each participant in a
majority opinion.”); Marlowe, supra note 89, at 12 (“Most new institutionalists believe
that legal constraints are a legitimate part of the constitutive effect on judges, making
an analysis of legal factors essential to a nuanced understanding of judicial behavior.”);
Novkov, supra note 78, at 814-18 (describing the new institutionalist’s view of the law’s
influence on the courts and critique of the attitudinal model).
Kahn, supra note 135, at 195-96 . See also Marlowe, supra note 89, at 39-40
(explaining how a jurisprudential regime will begin to end when the doctrine at issue
becomes outdated); Novkov, supra note 78, at 817-18 (describing new institutionalist
scholar Howard Gillman’s analysis of the Lochner era and how his work illustrated “the
courts’ construction of a new constitutional order around old principles but also how
and why that order was ultimately unsustainable as struggles between capital and labor
intensified in the political sphere.”).
Kahn, supra note 101, at 188; see also Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 72-73 (The
Court emphasizes that its legitimacy is based on the quality of its decision making, which
includes its ability to recognize when the social constructions prior rights were based on
are no longer valid.”). As institutionalist scholar Howard Gillman explains, “as with
any institution, those who are affiliated with the Court should be expected to deliberate
about protecting their institution’s legitimacy and (relatedly) adapting their institution’s
mission to changing contexts and the actions of other institutions; in other words, in
addition to performing a mission, institutional actors must consider issues of institutional
maintenance in the context of a dynamic social setting.” Gillman, supra note 94, at 81.
See also Novkov, supra note 78, at 824-25 (describing institutionalists positions on legal
change, noting that legal doctrine is “critically important … and its meaning changes in
response to the legal and political forces that act upon it”); Marlowe, supra note 89,
at 39-42 (describing the post-governance phase of a jurisprudential regime, where legal
doctrine loses its relevance and force due to societal changes). Kahn notes, however, that
for originalists, the Court’s legitimacy is undermined by this evolving rights approach.
See infra Part V(A).
Kahn, supra note 135, at 185-86. See also Kahn, supra note 101, at 143 (describing
the bi-directionality approach and its view that there is a “mutual construction process
involving internal institutional and precedential factors, as well as external factors”).
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Kahn terms this mutually constructive process, “principled bi-directional decision
making,” and it can lead to dramatic change in the law, including overturning
precedent.139

A. Principled Bi-Directional Decision Making
According to Kahn, principled bi-directional decision making (PBD) “is the means
through which the Court applies polity (political institutional) and rights principles,
in light of the lives of citizens as they have lived them … as the complexity and
the diversity of the nation’s society, economy, and politics increase.”140 PBD is
principled because it is based on legal doctrines and underlying institutional values;
but it is also bi-directional because the Court’s internal decision making norms
interact with the external social and political world.141 To put it another way, the
legal and institutional principles which the Court is constrained to follow, can only
gain meaning through their application to the outside world.142
PBD is a theoretical model that can explain Supreme Court decisions in
certain areas such as individual rights; specifically, Kahn asserts that PBD can
explain why “implied fundamental rights have been sustained and expanded in a
conservative political era.”143 He points to a number of key examples, including
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,144 Lawrence v. Texas,145 National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius,146 United States v. Windsor,147 and Obergefell v.
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140
141
142
143

144
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Kahn, supra note 135, at 175. PBD is the most recent term Kahn uses for this model;
his previous work details similar concepts with different nomenclature. E.g. Kahn &
Kersch, supra note 89, at 85.
Kahn, supra note 5, at 177.
Id. at 175, 184-85.
Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 68.
See Kahn, supra note 135, at 184-85. Ronald Kahn, The Right to Same-Sex Marriage:
Formalism, Realism, and Social Change in Lawrence (2003), Windsor (2013), &
Obergefell (2015), 75 Md. L. Rev. 271, 273 (2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court has reaffirmed
and expanded implied fundamental rights and equal protection under the law for gay
men and lesbians during a period of political dominance by social conservatives and
evangelical Christians, and other groups who view the protection of their definition of
family values as a central mission of government.”).
505 U.S. 833 (1992). In the Casey decision, the Supreme Court upheld the central
holding of Roe v. Wade, that the constitutional protected the right to abortion choice, but
also upheld a series of restrictions to accessing abortion, including express consent, a
24-hour waiting period, parental consent, and reporting requirements. 505 U.S. at 860,
876-901.
539 U.S. 558 (2003). In the 2003 Lawrence decision, the Court overturned Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) which had permitted anti-sodomy laws as applied
solely to gays and lesbians. 539 U.S. at 564-67. Lawrence recognized that the protection
of liberty within the Fourteenth Amendment, including the implied right to privacy,
rendered such laws unconstitutional. Id.
567 U.S. 519 (2012). In the Sebelius decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the individual mandate under the Affordable Care Act. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 563.
570 U.S. 744 (2013). In United States v. Windsor, the Court found that the Defense
of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) which had denied recognition of same sex marriage, was
unconstitutional. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775.
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Hodges.148 149 These decisions disappointed conservative activists who had hoped
for different outcomes in light of the number of Republican appointments to the
Supreme Court.150
A number of commentators and scholars explain these liberal outcomes by
pointing to the ideology of the justices joining the majority opinions, which in all but
Sebelius, consisted of liberal justices plus, in some cases, the long-acknowledged
“swing” votes of Justices O’Connor and/or Kennedy.151 Kahn, however, offers a
different, non-ideologically based explanation, a “contextual analysis” that explores
the relationship between the Court’s decision making process and society.152 Kahn
claims the theory of PBD offers superior explanatory utility, asserting that “most
social scientists and other legal scholars and experts in constitutional law have
failed to explain or predict the expansion of privacy rights and other individual
liberties,” in these important decisions.153
For example, according to Kahn, in Casey, PBD forced the Court to look at
the external society and acknowledge that the factual underpinnings of Roe, and
the general understanding of those facts, had not changed.154 In fact, since the Roe
decision, women’s place in society continued to expand significantly, and “women
and their families had grown to rely on the existence of rights of abortion choice.”155
In the process of engaging in PBD, the Court considered these external realities
in light of internal norms such as the importance of precedent and an apolitical
judiciary.156 Specifically, had the Court ignored the fact that societal facts still
supported the central holding of Roe and overturned that case in whole, the Court
would be seen as deciding the issue on “raw policy grounds, or in response to
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149

150
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153
154
155
156

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). In Obergefell v. Hodges, the court held that the fundamental right
to marry applies to same sex couples. 135 S. Ct. at 2604-2605.
Kahn, supra note 143, at 273. (discussing Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell; Kahn,
supra note 101 (discussing Sebelius); Kahn, supra note 136, at 178-184 (discussing the
Lawrence and Casey decisions); Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 68 (same).
Kahn, supra note 101, at 139. Conservatives were particularly critical of Justice Roberts’
decision to uphold the individual mandate under the ACA. “Since 1969, when President
Nixon named Warren Burger as Chief Justice, through 2005, when President George
W. Bush appointed Chief Justice John Roberts to and nominated Samuel Alito for the
Supreme Court, Republican presidents had made twelve of fourteen appointments to the
Supreme Court, thus constituting a clear majority of appointees in any given year.” Id. at
135-36.
E.g., Robert H. Smith, Uncoupling the “Centrist Bloc”-an Empirical Analysis of the
Thesis of A Dominant, Moderate Bloc on the United States Supreme Court, 62 Tenn. L.
Rev. 1, 38, 70-71 (1994) (Casey); Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme
Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1483, 1537-39
(2007) (Lawrence); Tonja Jacobi, Obamacare As A Window on Judicial Strategy, 80
Tenn. L. Rev. 763, 777 (2013) (Sebelius); Bertrall L. Ross II, The State As Witness:
Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial Distrust of the Legislative Record, 89 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 2027, 2029 (2014) (Windsor); Jane S. Schacter, Putting the Politics of “Judicial
Activism” in Historical Perspective, 2017 Sup. Ct. Rev. 209, 265-68 (2017) (Obergefell).
Kahn, supra note 101, at 140; Kahn, supra note 143, at 273-74.
Kahn, supra note 101, at 140; Kahn, supra note 143, at 273-74.
Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 70-71 (quoting 505 U.S. at 833, 864).
Id. at 72.
Id. Kahn, supra note 135, at 178.
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politics.”157 This would have undermined the Court’s legitimacy as an institution.158
In fact, as a result of these institutional forces, the Court not only upheld the central
holding of Roe v. Wade, it expanded beyond privacy rights as basis for doing so,
recognizing abortion choice as important to women’s rights of personhood as
well.159 Thus, according to Kahn, in the Casey example, PBD acted as a force of
both stability and change.160 The process of PBD led to continuity in the central
holding of Roe with new, reinvigorated legal principles for doing so, namely, a new
emphasis on relevance of abortion choice to women’s right of personhood, not just
privacy.161
According to Kahn, in Lawrence v. Texas, PBD led to significant legal change
expanding gay rights.162 Kahn asserts that, as in Casey, in Lawrence, the Court
considered the social factual background, but in this case found the facts, or
understanding of those facts, had changed.163 These new social constructions now
recognized gay citizens as possessing rights of privacy and personhood that were
often threatened by animus.164 In the mutual construction process of PBD, these
social constructions implicated key internal judicial norms that affected the Court’s
legitimacy.165 For example, Supreme Court decisions since Bowers v. Hardwick
offered expanded understanding of the connection between intimate choices and
the personal dignity and autonomy central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.166 Had the Court refused to apply this legal precedent on liberty to a
disfavored minority, it would be contrary to the Court’s norms of being apolitical and
its institutional role of protector of rights, even in the face of majority animosity.167
Kahn summarizes PBD in these two example cases as follows:
The Supreme Court sustains and expands individual rights, even gay rights,
because … majority and concurring Justices in Casey and Lawrence strongly
reject political contestation and majoritarian opinion as reasons on which to decide
implied fundamental rights cases. When the Casey and Lawrence Courts engaged
in PBD, they considered whether the rights at issue in these cases, privacy and
personhood, are still important and expanding and whether citizens have accepted
these rights in their lives.168
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Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 72.
Kahn, supra note 135, at 178; Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 71-72. Indeed, as Kahn
notes, the Casey decision explicitly acknowledges this concern for legitimacy. Id. at 71
(quoting 505 U.S. at 833, 864).
Kahn, supra note 135, at 178; Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 71-72.
Kahn, supra note 135, at 178; Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 71-72.
Kahn, supra note 135, at 178; Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 71-72.
Kahn, supra note 135, at 178-81.
Id. at 178-79.
Id. See also Kahn, supra note 143, at 289 (noting Kennedy’s reasoning in Lawrence
that “state prohibitions on sodomy caused prejudice against gays, even if states were
prohibiting all citizens from engaging in sodomy”) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575).
Kahn, supra note 135, at 180.
Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, (quoting Lawrence at 574).
Kahn, supra note 135, at 180.
Id. at 183.
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B. Social Construction
As the above examples show, PBD leads to changes in the law because PBD
considers changes in society and how the law must evolve to address them.169 Kahn
makes clear, however, that new social facts alone do not cause legal change; rather,
advocates must use “legal grammar” to tie new social facts to existing institutional
norms such as precedent or legal values of equal protection or liberty.170 Kahn defines
this conversion of raw fact into legally significant fact, “social construction,”171
and it is a central aspect of PBD described above. Kahn’s definition of social
construction is “both empirical and normative”—empirical because it draws on the
real lives of citizens and normative because it entails application of principles of
justice, liberty, and equality to these social facts.172 As described above, the process
of social construction played a role in the evolution of the law of abortion rights in
Casey and the law of gay rights in Lawrence.
Social constructions are woven within lines of Supreme Court cases and can
influence future decisions as much as legal principles.173 For example, after Reed
v. Reed and progressing through such cases as Frontiero v. Richardson, new social
facts on women’s expanding role in society became a social construction relevant
to the principle of equal protection.174 As Kahn described it, “[w]ith each new case,
social constructions would further illuminate what gender discrimination means,
and thus what constituted an equal protection violation.”175 Kahn identifies other
examples of social construction, such as the effect of psychological coercion on
children in Lee v. Weisman or the reality of domestic abuse and power disparity
between women and their spouses recognized in Casey.176 Kahn’s recent work,
however, cautions that the social construction must be robust in order to have
precedential effect.177 Social construction will not create effective legal principles
where social facts are not well connected to precedent, or the construction creates
an unworkable rule.178

C. Modern Decisions
Kahn continues to rely on PBD to explain the monumental decisions in Sebelius,
Windsor, and Obergefell, again rejecting a purely ideological explanation for the
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Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 72 (“When changes in society are symbiotic with
the Court’s evaluation of the application of rights principles, landmark cases will not
be overruled; when social constructions in past landmark cases are no longer tenable,
landmark cases are ripe for serious modification, if not outright overturning.”).
Kahn, supra note 135, at 185, 193; Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 86-87.
E.g., Kahn, supra note 135, at 193; Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 86.
Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 86.
Id. at 87.
Kahn, supra note 135, at 193; Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 87-88.
Kahn & Kersch, supra note 89, at 88.
Kahn, supra note 135, at 193.
Kahn, supra note 101, at 175-76.
Id. (discussing Roberts’ interpretation of the Commerce Clause in National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius, finding it unlikely to be applied and sustained in the
long term because it is impossible to clarify his interpretations key distinction between
action/inaction and this construction’s conflict with prior precedent).
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Justices’ individual decisions on the case.179 For example, Kahn describes Chief
Justice Roberts’ decision in Sebelius as bringing external economic realities into an
analysis of principles of federalism and separation of powers and of prior cases on
the Commerce and Taxing Clauses. 180 According to Kahn, Justice Roberts’ refusal to
find authority for the ACA under the Commerce Clause stems from “his comparison
of the failure of citizens to purchase health insurance with the failure of farmers to
purchase wheat in Wickard and the failure of persons to grow and use marijuana in
Raich.”181 This connection between external facts and internal norms (precedent)
matches Kahn’s definition of PBD, principled based decision making, not ideology
based. Kahn similarly describes Justice Ginsberg’s dissent, not as a justification
for her preferred ideological outcome, but rather as bi-directional decision making,
specifically, a critique of the Roberts’ opinion’s economic construction.182 According
to Kahn, this dispute among the justices over how to incorporate economic realities
into law reflects the centrality of the construction process to decision making, a key
premise of his PBD theory in contrast to ideological explanations.183
Kahn also offers this alternative explanation for the outcome in subsequent
gay rights cases. In Windsor, instead of turning solely on the political viewpoints of
the justices with Kennedy as the key swing vote, Kahn sees principled (precedent
and rights based) bi-directional (external world affecting those precedents) decision
making.184 Kahn describes how the majority opinion brought in the outside world,
the lived lives of same sex families,185 to existing precedent on marriage and
gay rights.186 According to Khan, Kennedy looked outside of the bounds of the
Constitution to consider the burdens DOMA placed on the family life of same sex
couples and families, and that this reality demonstrated why DOMA was a denial
of equal protection and liberty.187 With respect to Obergefell, again, Kahn finds that
ideology-based theories of judicial decision making do not fully explain this case’s
dramatic outcome.188 Kahn notes that Obergefell is the logical next step in the social
construction process started by Lawrence and continuing through other cases such
as Windsor.189 In all of these cases, the lived lives of gay families are connected
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E.g., Kahn, supra note 101, at 162 (asserting that in Sebelius, “[c]onservative and liberal
Justices … engage in a bidirectional Supreme Court decision-making process that
incorporates the outside economic, social, and political world.”).
Id. at 159 (Roberts engaged in “an economic construction process … drawing analogies
between the construction processes of the individual mandate as compared to the
economic constructions of prior Commerce and Taxing Clause jurisprudence.”).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 176-77.
Kahn, supra note 143, at 299.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 299 (“The majority opinion in Windsor is a classic example of … bidirectional
decision-making. The principles and social constructions that produced a liberty of
sexual relations in Lawrence led to the principles and social constructions behind the
Windsor decision.”).
Id. at 292.
Id. at 302. (Obergefell “cannot be explained by external factors that are emphasized
by political scientists employing the attitudinal and regime approach to explain Court
decision-making…”).
Kahn, supra note 143, at 301-303. “In Obergefell, as in Windsor and Lawrence, the Court
emphasizes the importance of marriage in fostering deep, enduring personal relations
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to legal principles of liberty and equal protection; a process of social construction
which leads to the liberal outcome.190
Thus, the historical institutionalist theory of PBD offers a method for
persuading justices. Through social construction, advocates can tie changes in
the lives of citizens to existing legal principles to show how the law must evolve
and change as well. This theory offers an explanation for a number of cases with
progressive outcomes. The FJP would like to do the same thing: convince judges
to change the law towards a more feminist legal reasoning and case decisions.191
If the FJP uses the institutional change mechanism of PBD, perhaps the Project
can succeed in its goals and influence even the current, conservative judiciary. The
following section explores this question.

IV. The FJP’s Use of Historical Institutionalist Change
Techniques
A number of decisions in the FJP use social construction, which, according to
Kahn’s theories of historical institutionalism, is a method of persuasion that can
lead to legal change. Although the FJP limited the opinion writers to the facts
available in the record or that were suitable to judicial notice,192 in many cases
the FJP authors pointed to previously unconsidered, or improperly discounted
facts.193 As described below, in the FJP opinions, these social understandings are
tied directly to legal principles to inform their interpretation. This process mirrors
Professor Kahn’s description of principled based decision making where the law
can change when social realities are specifically tied to existing legal values.194
The following sections describe two major social themes that appear in a number
of FJP decisions: a broader understanding of sexual violence and harassment and
expanded recognition of the experiences of gay, and transgender, people.

A. Social Construction in the FJP: #MeToo and the Law
Although the FJP precedes the popularization of #MeToo, many FJP authors draw
on the broader understanding of sexual violence and harassment that has since been
more widely recognized as a result of the #MeToo movement195 and the related
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deserving of protection; the hurt and loss of dignity to children and parents in same-sex
families caused by the prejudice of the wider society towards them; and the rejection of
simple, moral disapproval against gays as a basis for legislation.” Id. at 303.
Id. at 303.
Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 5.
Id. at 10; Crawford, supra note 2, at 3.
See infra Parts IV(A) & (B). See also Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 15-16
(describing feminist method of using facts the law “often shies away from”).
See supra Part III.
Although originally founded by Tarana Burke over ten years ago, the #MeToo became
a national phenomenon in 2017 after a number of famous actresses came forward with
their stories of abuse and harassment. Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #Metoo,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual Regulation, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 825, 831
at n. 24, 866-867 (2019). “Initially intended as a means of cultivating empathy among
young women for other victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault, the movement
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organization TimesUp.196 The #MeToo movement has received significant media
coverage and started a new national conversation about the sexual abuse of women
by men with power over their careers.197 Women under the #MeToo umbrella have
come forward to report real life instances of mistreatment and crime, with many
high profile perpetrators being held to account.198 A number of the opinions in
the FJP are fortuitously drawing on themes that the #MeToo movement has been
broadcasting widely.199 Moreover, the authors not only identify these new social
facts, they specifically tie them to legal precedents and values using the “legal
grammar” a judicial opinion requires.200 This full, social construction, provides the
dual force of new fact and legal argument that Kahn describes as persuasive.201
The rewritten opinion of Dothard v. Rawlinson,202 is an example of this social
construction. The original Supreme Court opinion held that the height and weight
requirements imposed by Alabama’s correctional department violated the prohibition
of sex discrimination in employment because it disparately excluded women and
the state failed to show the requirements were necessary for the position.203 At the
same time, the Court also held that sex was a bona fide occupational qualification
(“BFOQ”) for guarding a men’s prison due to the risk of sexual assault, and, as
a result, women could be completely excluded from that job.204 In the rewritten

and its representative hashtag have come to represent the ubiquity of the offenses--and
a society and legal culture that seem to condone the conduct.” Id. at 866. See also Jamie
R. Abrams, The #Metoo Movement: An Invitation for Feminist Critique of Rape Crisis
Framing, 52 U. Rich. L. Rev. 749, 750 (2018) (“After decades of a relatively stagnant
and opaque framing of rape and sexual assault through the lens of crisis, the #MeToo
Movement “unleashed one of the highest-velocity shifts in our culture since the 1960s”
with social media as its “powerful accelerant.” With the click of a “MeToo” hashtag,
virtually overnight, a modern anti-sexual assault and -sexual harassment movement was
born.”).
196
“#MeToo has spawned similar social justice-oriented organizations, including Time’s
Up, a ‘solution-based, action-oriented next step in the [# MeToo] movement’ that
focuses on passing legislation and changing policies to address the systemic sources of
inequality--lack of representation, gendered pay disparities, and the unequal distribution
of power--that cultivate the conditions in which sexual harassment and violence may
occur.
Murray, supra note 195, at 866-67.
197
E.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice
in Employment Law: Where To, #MeToo?, 54 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 156, 193-196
(2019); L. Camille Herbert, Is ‘MeToo’ Only a Social Movement or a Legal Movement
Too?, 22 Empl. Rts. & Employ. Pol’y J. 321, 322-23 (2018).
198
“Using social media and the press, the # MeToo movement has identified recidivist
harassers and workplaces where sexual harassment and sexual assault are rife, advocated
for increased workplace harassment training, and, ultimately, called for the expulsion
from the workplace of several high-profile men who, for years, engaged in objectionable
conduct with impunity.” Murray, supra note 195, at 833. See also, Elizabeth C. Tippett,
The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 Minn. L. Rev. 230, 230-32 (2018)
(describing the MeToo movement and listing the prominent men accused and later fired).
199
See Herbert, supra note 197, at 322-23.
200
See infra.
201
See supra Part III.
202
Ontiveros, supra note 32, at 213.
203
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-32 (1977).
204
Id. at 334-37.
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feminist judgment, concurring and dissenting in part, Professor Maria Ontiveros
critiques this BFOQ argument for its stereotyping of women as the cause of sexual
assault,205 echoing a theme of #MeToo.206 As Ontiveros explains in her dissenting
part, the majority accepted the assertion by the state that sexual assaults against
female guards are inevitable; ignoring evidence that the prison system made a
series of choices in the structure of the prison that created this hazard and failed to
take available steps, used in other systems, to eliminate it.207 As Ontiveros explains,
“the majority’s line of reasoning reinforces the stereotypes that women are, first and
foremost, sexual objects whose very presence cause sexual assault [relying] on the
unstated premise that the stereotype is fixed, normal and natural, and nothing can
be done to change it.”208 Ontiveros then takes the next step in social construction by
tying this social understanding of assault to the law. Specifically, she notes how all
of these assumptions are stereotypes about the nature and roles of women, and that
precedent explicitly prohibits basing a BFOQ defense on stereotypes.209 She also
draws the logical corollary that BFOQ is not available when the employer itself
creates the conditions that make a position inhospitable to a particular gender.210
The rewritten opinion in Meritor Saving Bank also emphasizes a #MeToo
principle, that there are many reasons why victims of harassment cannot
immediately report the misconduct or find help,211 and adds another feature of
new social facts, the intersectional impact of race and gender.212 The original
Meritor opinion established the first definitive definition of sexual harassment as
a form of sex discrimination under Title VII, requiring plaintiffs to show severe
or pervasive misconduct based on sex that was both objectively and subjectively
offensive.213 In rewriting Meritor, Onwuachi-Willig took the opportunity to offer
a new foundational definition that removed the problematic aspects of subjective
offense (unwelcomeness), objective offense assessed by a “neutral” standard, and
the severe and pervasive language which has proven to be a significant roadblock
to plaintiffs’ recovery.214 This rejection of the current legal standard for sexual
harassment resonates with the #MeToo and TimesUp efforts to address harassment,
including the unduly demanding legal standards as well as other barriers.215 In the
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Brenda V. Smith, Commentary on Dothard v. Rawlingson, in Feminist Judgments:
Supreme Court, supra note 4, at 209; Ontiveros, supra note 32, at 223-25.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Where #MeToo Came From, and Where It’s Going, The
Atlantic, Mar. 24, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/catharinemackinnon-what-metoo-has-changed/585313/.
Ontiveros, supra note 32, at 217, 225-26.
Id. at 223-24.
Id. at 218, 223-27.
Id. at 223-27.
Abrams, supra note 195, at 771 (“The #MeToo Movement powerfully revealed the
harsh reality that many women are not able to reveal their victimization for decades or
years for myriad of reasons.”). See also Herbert, supra note 199, at 331-32 (noting the
#MeToo movements potential to inform courts about “the complexity of reasons women
fail to promptly report harassing conduct”).
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 31, at 303; Abrams, supra note 195, at 779-81.
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-67 (1986).
Tiscione, supra note 74, at 300, Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 31, at 315-17.
See, e.g., Jessica Clarke, The Rules of #MeToo, forthcoming 2019 at 7-10; Herbert, supra
note 197, at 325-26, 329-31; Tippett, supra note 198, at 241-49.
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rewritten opinion, “the gravamen” of a sexual harassment claim is now “whether the
challenged conduct unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work environment
or performance, create a hostile or intimidating environment, or worked to preserve
patterns of sex segregation in employment.”216 Professor Onwuachi-Willig,
removes the unwelcome requirement altogether, because focusing on whether the
harassment was welcome ignores the power differentials that make it less likely that
some women, given their economic or career vulnerabilities, are able to resist or
complain, the accepted evidence of unwelcomeness.217
In her discussion, Onwuachi-Willig also emphasized the particular vulnerability
of black women, citing studies that showed their claims of sexual harm were less
likely to believed and the stereotypes of black women as sexually immoral that
contribute to this.218 To legally capture this social reality, she created a different
standard for assessing whether there is a hostile work environment, asking how the
reasonable person with the complainant’s identity characteristics, here a reasonable
black woman, would perceive events instead of the original reasonable person
standard.219 Onwuachi-Willig moves beyond the hashtag MeToo movement in this
intersectional analysis, echoing perhaps more of the original #MeToo creator’s
message.220 Overall, she ties a broader understanding of the real life experiences
of women, and black women in particular, into the legal definitions of harassment.
Other rewritten opinions reflect the increased social recognition of the nature,
extent, and implications of sexual violence and harassment. In the rewritten Gebser
v. Lago Vista,221 for example, Professor Ann Bartow crafted a dissent rejecting the
original opinion’s characterization of sex between a thirteen (to fifteen) year old
and her teacher as a “relationship,” correctly identifying this as rape due to the
student’s age and lack of capacity to consent.222 Bartow further explores the social
facts of how difficult it is for a minor to report sexual misconduct by a teacher with
authority over their grades and courses.223 Bartow’s contextualization for a minor
victim resonates with Tarana Burke’s original MeToo and its empathetic focus on
younger victims of sexual violence; although Bartow’s case lacks the intersectional
perspective Burke also emphasizes.224 Bartow then ties this reality to the legal
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The Founder of #MeToo Doesn’t Want Us to Forget Victims of Color, PBS NewsHour
(Nov. 15, 2017, 6:35 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/the-founder-of-metoodoesnt-want-us-to-forget-victims-of-color (MeToo creator Tarana Burke discussing
how black women and girls are viewed as inherently sexual and therefore less likely
to be believed when asserting claims of assault or harassment) Although Ms. Burke
expressed this intersectional reality, others have critiqued MeToo for failing to address
the specific experience of black women. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, What About #ustoo?:
The Invisibility of Race in the #Metoo Movement, 128 Yale L.J. Forum 105, 107-108
(2018).
Bartow, supra note 32, at 430.
Michelle S. Simon, Commentary on Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,
in Feminist Judgments: Supreme Court, supra note 4, at 428; Bartow, supra note 32,
at 431, 436.
Bartow, supra note 32, at 437-38, 443.
History & Vision, metoo, https://metoomvmt.org/about/#history (last visited July 26,
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standard, again rejecting the original majority opinion and its requirement that a
school have actual notice and fail to act before it is liable for a teacher’s harassment
of a student.225 Instead, Bartow offers a standard of liability based on agency law,
that “a school district is liable under Title IX if a teacher’s sexual harassment
was ‘facilitated either expressly or implicitly, by the teacher’s actual or apparent
authority as an employee of the school.’”226 This rewritten opinion also echoes
some of the messages of the #MeToo and TimesUp movements more generally—
namely the role of power disparity in facilitating sexual abuse,227 and the need for
more effective, systemic solutions.228
Other examples include the rewritten opinions of Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales229 and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.230 In Town of Castle
Rock, the Supreme Court originally held that a victim of domestic violence had no
federal constitutional right to the enforcement of a civil restraining order against
her husband, despite a Colorado statute mandating such enforcement.231 In the
rewritten majority opinion, Professor Maria Isabel Medina comes to the opposite
conclusion, finding a property interest in such enforcement that is protected by the
Due Process Clause.232 Medina’s opinion provided detailed social facts highlighting
the pervasiveness of domestic violence and the history of police under-enforcement
of protective orders based on long standing stereotypes about “primacy of male
spouses as heads of households” and “views of women as naturally submissive,
indecisive, and prone to complaint, but likely to retract allegations of domestic
violence.”233 Medina reasoned that the Colorado legislature sought specifically
to counteract those problems by requiring enforcement of domestic violence
protective orders.234 She engaged in social construction by tying these concepts
to existing precedent on property rights. 235 She reasoned that the Colorado statute
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wealth communities. She developed culturally-informed curriculum to discuss sexual
violence within the Black community and in society at large. Similarly, the ‘me too’
movement seeks to support folks working within their communities to attend to the
specific needs of their community/communities, i.e. supporting disabled trans survivors
of color working to lead and craft events/toolkits/etc. with other disabled trans survivors.
Together, we can uplift and support each other to strengthen a global movement to
interrupt sexual violence.”).
Bartow, supra note 32, at 443-44.
Id. at 444.
See, e.g., Open Letter from Time’s Up, News Documents, N.Y. Times, https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/01/arts/02women-letter.html?_r=0 (last visited July
26, 2019).
Jennifer Smola, Founder of ‘Me Too’ Movement Fears Narrative Being Hijacked from
Helping Survivors Heal, Columbus Dispatch (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.dispatch.
com/news/20180423/founder-of-me-too-movement-fears-narrative-being-hijackedfrom-helping-survivors-heal (“This is about systems. There were systems in place that
allowed [perpetrators of sexual violence] to behave the way they behaved … . It has to
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Medina, supra, note 31, at 508-26.
McGinley, supra note 31, at 414-25.
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766-67 (2005).
Medina, supra, note 31, at 518-26.
Id. at 512.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 518-19.
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created a bundle of rights, and that the Court had found other analogous state
benefits to be protected by Due Process.236 Although not the main focus of the
#MeToo movement, which in its current iteration most often concerns workplace
abuse, some of the movement’s themes have been extended to domestic violence.237
Indeed, as Professor Jane Stoever explains, “[t]he recent #MeToo movement is
relevant to societal and legal responses to gender-based violence … [and] reveals the
persistent societal reluctance to believe abuse survivors and offer real remedies.”238
Thus, Medina’s rewritten opinion is also engaged in social construction on issues
of increasing social salience.
In the rewritten Oncale decision, Professor Ann McGinley continues the
process of social construction identified by Kahn, and extends Title VII to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.239 The original Oncale decision
found that harassment between members of the same sex would also violate Title
VII’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex; but did not address sexual
orientation discrimination.240 McGinley’s rewritten per curium opinion has the
same outcome, but extends the legal reasoning to specifically find that harassment
and discrimination based on sexual orientation violates the statute as well.241
McGinley reasons that the existing legal basis for finding that discrimination based
on sex includes discrimination for failure to meet the social expectations for gender,
women who are insufficiently feminine or men who are insufficiently masculine.242
She then engages in social construction by extending this concept to animosity
toward sexual orientation, explaining how this too is inextricably connected
to stereotypes about the “proper” behavior of men and women.243 Specifically,
drawing on masculinities theory she cites research that it is virtually impossible
to distinguish between animosity towards a man’s failure to meet expectations of
masculinity and animosity toward homosexuality.244 She therefore concludes that
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Jane K. Stoever, Access to Safety and Justice: Service of Process in Domestic Violence
Cases, 94 Wash. L. Rev. 333, 335 (2019). She also notes #MeToo is hindered by some of
the same negative forces, such as infighting that appeared in the early battered women’s
movement. Id.
McGinley, supra note 31, at 424.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998).
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Linda Greenhouse, On LGBTQ Rights the Supreme Court Asks the Question, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 25, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/opinion/lgbt-rights-supremecourt.html?searchResultPosition=4.
McGinley, supra note 31, at 423.
Id. at 423-24.
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Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity, in Theorizing Masculinities 119-41
(Harry Brod & Michael Kaufman eds. 1994)).
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a victim of same sex harassment may show the mistreatment was because of sex
and thus actionable under Title VII by showing the harasser was motivated by the
victim’s failure to “adhere to masculine (or feminine) stereotypes including the
real or perceived sexual orientation of the victim.”245 Although not as explicitly
tied to the #MeToo movement, McGinley’s analysis does tie into an increasing
social understanding of the harm of toxic masculinity, which has been part of the
#MeToo discussion, and is now so prevalent as to appear in razor commercials and
medical recommendations.246 Thus, in a number of the FJP’s rewritten Supreme
Court decisions, we see opinion authors tying increasingly salient social facts
to legal principles, which is the type of argument Kahn identifies as potentially
persuasive.

B. Tax Opinions and Continued Social Recognition of LGBTQ
Rights
Kahn’s description of social construction, the way evolving social norms can be
incorporated into legal rules and thus change the law, is echoed in a number of
rewritten tax opinions of the FJP as well. A number of authors offer alternative legal
standards based on modern feminist theory and more complete and compassionate
factual backgrounds. For example, as described below, three of these opinions offer
a roadmap for courts to consider new understandings of LGBTQ rights, life, and
dignity, again echoing a method of social construction Kahn found to be effective
in creating progressive legal change, even in a conservative court.
In the rewritten opinion in Magdalin v. Commissioner, Professor Jennifer
Bird-Pollan challenges the U.S. Tax Court’s refusal to grant a medical deduction to
a fertile gay man who used reproductive technology in order to have biologically
related children.247 The original opinion refused the deduction on the basis that the
taxpayer did not suffer from a disease or defect requiring the fertility treatments.248
At issue was the definition of medical care, which is deductible, under §213 of
the Tax Code.249 Unlike the original opinion which focused on §213’s language
defining medical care as treatment of disease,250 Bird-Pollan emphasized the second
part of §213’s definition, whether the amounts paid “for the purpose of affecting any
structure or function of the body.”251 The rewritten opinion found that reproduction
is a type of human functioning and thus reproductive treatments are covered by
§213’s second part, regardless of the presence or lack of a medical disease or
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McGinley, supra note 31, at 424. She also changed the burden of proof. Margaret E.
Johnson, Commentary to Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Services, Inc., in Feminist
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(CCH) ¶ 50, 150 (1st Cir. 2009).
I.R.C. § 213(a).
Magdalin, 96 T.C.M at 492.
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defect.252 This legal argument is presented in the context of important social facts
about the reality of gay life and families, echoing the process Kahn identified
in the Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell decisions.253 As Bird-Pollan explains,
although some heterosexual couples require assisted reproductive technology due
to medical conditions, “a large category of people … by the very nature of their
identity, will also require IVF in order to facilitate reproduction.”254 The original
opinion’s conclusion that a fertile gay man could not deduct IVF expenses comes
with the “unstated implication” that heterosexual intercourse was the proper way
to have a child.255 As Bird-Pollan’s opinion explains, allowing a deduction ART
for heterosexual couples but not fertile gay prospective parents “raise specters of
discrimination on the part of the government” and injects non-determinative facts,
namely, sexual orientation, into a tax deduction issue.256
The rewritten opinion in O’Donnabhaim v. Commissioner similarly uses a
broader understanding of the dignity of transgender people to construct the law
on tax deductibility of gender confirmation surgery.257 In the original opinion, the
Tax Court found that the taxpayer could deduct a significant portion, but not all, of
the surgery and related treatment as a medical expense.258 The court’s conclusion,
however, was based on a finding that the taxpayer suffered from a disease.259
Professor David Cruz’s rewritten opinion avoids the stigmatizing disease focus
and incorporates a new social acceptance of the transgendered, by finding medical
deductibility elsewhere.260 Indeed, his opinion specifically explains the harms of
treating transgenderism as a kind of illness.261 The new opinion therefore establishes
that gender difference affects the structure and function of the body and is therefore
deductible under the second part of §213.262 In this manner Cruz analogizes gender
confirmation surgery to vasectomies or abortions that do not treat a disease but
that are nonetheless deductible as medical expenses.263 With the acknowledged
cautions against stigmatizing the transgendered by undue emphasis on “disease”,
Cruz’s opinion also presents the reasoning on why gender reassignment surgery
and related expenses also meet the standard for treatment under the first portion of
§213.264 He does so as a Tax Court opinion author, recognizing that the IRS might
appeal the decision and that in later analysis, disease may be the taxpayer’s only
winning argument.265 He does so in light of the “benefits that the (Gender Identity
Disorder) diagnosis has brought, especially to trans people of limited economic
means” and ‘[i]n the interest of doing justice to the real human person before us.”266
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This theme of dignity is similar to the dignity concerns raised in the Lawrence,
Windsor, and Obergefell decisions, and Kahn identifies these themes as part of the
PBD process which led to the progressive decisions.267
Finally, in the rewritten opinion in United States v. Windsor, Professor Ruthann
Robson invigorates even this progressive decision with newer and different
understandings of society.268 Her rewritten opinion has the same outcome as the
original, but offers a legal basis that more robustly prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and recognizes the wide variety of family structures in
current society.269 The original opinion reasoned that in the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), the federal government was treating some state sanctioned marriages,
same sex, differently from others, in a manner that violated due process rights and
equal protection under the constitution.270 The original opinion did not specifically
call sexual orientation a suspect class nor designate a level scrutiny for it.271 The
rewritten opinion, in contrast, does not find any due process violation, and instead
treats sexual orientation as a suspect classification subject to intermediate scrutiny
under the equal protection clause.272 Now six years after the original Windsor, it
is possible that Robson’s rewritten opinion taps a current social construction that
supports protected class status for sexual orientation.273
The rewritten opinion also reflects a critique of the original Windsor opinion,
that by basing the marriage rights on due process, it unduly glorified the status of
marriage in a society of increasing variety of family structure.274 Instead, the focus on
equal protection turns the focus toward harm of sexual orientation discrimination.275
Thus, the rewritten opinion avoids discussion of the harm to children which the
original opinion mentioned frequently, despite the fact that the lesbian family which
brought the suit had no children.276 Recognizing the new social reality of increasing
variety in family structure, Robson removes the emphasis on traditional marriage
and procreative purpose, to avoid “elevating a biological component to parenting
that denigrates every adoptive or nonbiological parent, whether male or female.”277
Although taking social construction beyond the issue of sexual orientation in the
original Windsor, to include non-marital families in her rewrite, Robson is still
using the PBD method to emphasize the legal importance of a broad social reality.
Overall, in each of these opinions, social facts infuse the analysis, guiding
the rewritten opinion authors to new legal standards and alternative reasoning.
Significantly, the reasoning in these opinions in not fictional; rather, it also draws
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on precedents, statutes, and regulations, the proper legal grammar for a court.278 In
this manner, the FJP opinions are engaging in social construction, the key aspect of
PBD, a process that allows changes in social understandings to potentially change
the law.279 By explicitly tying broader social acceptance and understanding of
citizens’ lived lives to existing legal norms, the FJP follows the blueprint for legal
change described by Professor Kahn.280

V. Critique and Analysis
The historical institutionalist theory of PBD can help explain certain court decisions
that unexpectedly expanded or preserved individual rights. As explained in Part IV,
a number of the FJP opinions use the tool of PBD, social construction, to offer
persuasive arguments to change the law. Thus, a political science-based argument
for the efficacy and utility of the FJP is available. This argument is not without
critique or limitation, however. First, PBD theory comes with an acknowledged
barrier - originalist281 judges do not engage in PBD and, thus, are not moved to
change the law by the presentation of new social facts.282 Section A below explores
the degree to which originalism blocks the PBD method of legal change pursued
by the FJP. Second, a number of FJP opinions go further than PBD to engage in
displacement, the wholesale substitution of existing rules.283 Section B explores
the challenges for these opinions which seek more fundamental change to existing
precedent. Finally, in response to these critiques and to present a fuller picture,
Section C explores alternative ways that the FJP can be effective, other than social
construction and displacement.

A. The Problem of Originalists
A court will engage in PDB when it believes that adapting to social change is
necessary to sustain legitimacy.284 Originalists, however, believe the opposite, that
judicial expansion of rights beyond those historically recognized is unprincipled and
undermines respect for the courts.285 As Kahn explains, originalists such as Scalia,
“refus[e] to accept PBD and all rights based on that process, if that process moves
beyond intentions derived from founding periods. Thus, Roe, Casey, Romer, and
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Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power 1, 15-16 (James
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Lawrence are all illegitimate claims of “Constitutional” law.”286 According to Kahn,
the real fissure on the Supreme Court, and to some degree politics more broadly, is not
conservative versus liberal, but rather, originalist versus non-originalist.287 This debate
is not limited to the controversial decisions on gay rights or abortion, but extends to
the nature of judicial decision-making and the role of the judiciary in government.288
A number of Supreme Court decisions reflect the limitations of PBD to create
progressive outcomes when a significant portion of the Court is originalist.289 As
just one example, the Supreme Court’s decision to allow President Trump’s ban
on transgendered people serving in the military290 stands in direct contrast to the
rewritten opinion in O’Donnabhaim v. Commissioner291. Moreover, the recent
appointment of Justices Kavanaugh and Gorsuch seems to have solidified an
originalist bloc on the Court.292 Thus, the originalists’ objection to PBD, combined
with their status on the Supreme Court, does threaten to undermine the efficacy of
social construction-based persuasion.
That said, perhaps Chief Justice Roberts’ apparent new role as the swing vote
leaves the door open to PDB and some version of social fact-based argument.293
Indeed, his apparent concern for the Court’s legitimacy294 is, according to historical
institutionalists, one of the foundational motivations that can drive judicial decision
making away from ideology.295 In addition to Roberts’ potentially moderating path,
as noted above, there are a number of empirical studies showing that law can still
play at least some role in Supreme Court decision making even with ideological and
strategic voting.296 Indeed, historical examples provide some basis for optimism. In
an in-depth, comparative case-study of death penalty and abortion cases before the
Supreme Court from 1972 through 1989, which included the Reagan/Bush Court,
political science scholars Lynn Epstein and Joseph Kobylka examined the cause of
legal change.297 Their study identified a myriad of factors influencing the Court’s
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Scalia, approach the law as a textualist-originalist. His early opinions on the Supreme
Court suggest as much, he has said so himself, and observers seem to agree with the
characterization.”); Jeremy Kidd, New Metrics and the Politics of Judicial Selection,
70 Ala. L. Rev. 785, 804 (2019) (“As an originalist, Kavanaugh scored well on the
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Swing Vote, N.Y. Times, June 28, 2018 at A19; Benjamin Pomerance, Center of Order:
Chief Justice John Roberts and the Coming Struggle for A Respected Supreme Court, 82
Alb. L. Rev. 449, 524-32 (2019).
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decisions, including changes in Court personnel, interest group mobilization and
political context.298 Their study, however, also concluded that the legal arguments
by the attorneys and within the amicus briefs had an influence as well, and that
ultimately, “legal arguments grounded in law matter, and they matter dearly …
arguments seem to influence most clearly the content and direction of the legal
change that results.”299
Thus, overall, the prospects for the FJP to be persuasive are mixed, particularly
with respect to the FJP’s rewritten Supreme Court opinions. The historical
institutionalists present PBD, a compelling theory for the efficacy of persuasive
arguments such as those offered by the FJP, and some empirical and case studies
support this premise. Given the resistance of originalists, however, this branch of
political science cannot offer a complete defense of the Project’s utility.

B. Displacement
A number of opinions within the FJP are subject to an even stronger critique because
they engage in displacement, a more radical method of legal change than PBD. In
PBD, existing legal principles are considered and applied in light of new social
facts, a mutually constructive process that gives current legal rules an important
role.300 In contrast, sometimes groups seek to completely substitute one set of rules
for another, a process historical institutionalists term displacement.301 Displacement
is a more difficult type of change for out of power groups to achieve.302 As
described below, some of the rewritten FJP opinions concerning disparate impact
are attempting this displacement, and in so doing, fail to offer strongly persuasive
arguments for future use.
Disparate impact is a theory of discrimination that does not involve intentional
conduct, but rather finds unintentional, or covert, acts create unequal results for
protected groups.303 As described below, in a number of FJP rewritten opinions, the
authors pursue equality on disparate impact theories, challenging neutral laws that
disproportionately harm women. At first glance, the FJP opinions discussing disparate
impact could seem to be effective under the concept of PBD. Specifically, many
disparate impact arguments offered by the FJP reference the phenomenon of implicit
bias—a term for subconscious bias that results in unequal outcomes.304 Implicit bias
is gaining increased social recognition as a non-intentional, but nonetheless real,
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source of discrimination.305 As Kahn makes clear, however, the mere presence of
new social facts does not lead to change, but rather it is the ability to tie those facts
to specific existing legal concepts that influences judges.306 Thus, although there are
advances in understanding implicit bias, there is strong legal precedent requiring
intentional discrimination that makes the adoption of these disparate impact theories
much more difficult.307 Thus, according to historical institutionalists, the adoption of
the FJP’s disparate impact theories would not be the evolutionary social construction
found in PDB, but rather, would require wholesale substitution of existing legal
rules, a form of displacement which is not easily achieved.308
For example, in the rewritten Griswold v. Connecticut decision, Professor
Laura Rosenbury came to the same outcome as the original opinion, finding
Connecticut statutes criminalizing birth control to be unconstitutional, but offered
a different legal basis.309 Instead of a right to privacy, Rosenbury invalidates the
statutes based on Due Process and Equal Protection.310 Specifically, Rosenbury
takes advantage of the historically situated posture of each rewrite. According
to the premise of the FJP, opinion authors are bound by existing law at the time,
but not future decisions.311 Thus, Rosenbury’s rewrite is before the Washington v.
Davis case which held that only intentional discrimination creates a constitutional
violation.312 Rosenbury, therefore ignores Washington v. Davis and finds disparate

305

306
307

308
309
310

311
312

Tryon P. Woods, The Implicit Bias of Implicit Bias Theory, 10 Drexel L. Rev. 631, 636
(2018) (The scientific research on implicit bias has proliferated in recent years, with
empirical findings documenting the pervasive reality of unconscious racism.). See also
e.g. Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice Announces New Department-Wide
Implicit Bias Training for Personnel, Department of Justice (June 27, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-new-department-wide-implicitbias-training-personnel; Khiara M. Bridges, Implicit Bias and Racial Disparities
in Health Care, 43 Hum. Rts. 19 (2018); Thomas C. Grella, Implicit Bias: A Hidden
Obstacle to Exemplary Firm Culture, 45 Law Prac. 62 (May/June 2019).
See supra Part III(B).
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Personnel Administrator of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Dale Margolin Cecka, Commentary to Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, in Feminist Judgments: Supreme Court, supra note 4, at 343 (“The
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Feingold, Equal Protection Design Defects, 91 Temp. L. Rev. 513, 519 (2019) (A trio
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to facially neutral state action) (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278-79; Arlington Heights,
429 U.S. at 265; Davis, 426 U.S. at 240.); Kellen Funk, The Present Crisis in American
Bail, 128 Yale L.J. Forum 1098, 1112 (2019) (noting the Supreme Court disfavors
discrimination claims based on disparate impact without “ironclad proof of intentional
animus”) (citing Washington v. Davis); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection,
124 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 764 (2011) (“In the vast run of cases after Feeney, only facial
discrimination has drawn heightened scrutiny under the equal protection guarantees.”).
See Bleich, supra note 302, at 66. See also Mahoney & Thelen, supra note 283, at 19.
Rosenbury, supra note 31, at 103-113.
Cynthia Hawkins Debose, Commentary to Griswold v. Connecticut, in Feminist
Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the Supreme Court, supra note 4, at 98, 101;
Rosenbury, supra note 31, at 106-111.
Stanchi Introduction, supra note 1, at 10; Crawford, supra note 2, at 3.
Debose, supra note 310, at 102 (“In recognizing this disparate impact, Rosenbury
seeks to stave off the Court’s subsequent holding in Washington v. Davis, which limited
constitutional challenges to claims of intentional discrimination.”).
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impact violates the Equal Protection clause, as if to start an alternative timeline of
the law.313 This outcome might be historically possible at the time of the decision;
however, arguments imagining the absence of a case that does, in fact, exist are
less useful for the FJP’s goal to affect future decisions. This feminist rewrite in
Griswold offers the type of displacement that, according to political scientists, is
hard for out of power groups to win.314
In the rewritten opinions that post-date Washington v. Davis, the authors do not
try to reverse that precedent, as doing so would violate the premise of the FJP.315
In one of the post- Washington cases, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, however, the
opinion author worked with disparate impact in another context that was also
contrary to existing precedent.316 In the rewritten Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
opinion, Professor Martha Chamallas writes a concurring opinion to emphasize
the role of implicit bias in employment decisions,317 and urges courts to play close
attention to expert testimony318. “Chamallas rejects the focus on conscious intent as
the touchstone of ‘real’ discrimination … [and] requires courts to look at the totality
of a corporate culture.”319 As with the Griswold rewrite as described above, the
rewritten Price Waterhouse decision takes advantage of its historical posture. The
Supreme Court generally rejected these ideas on implicit bias and reliance on expert
testimony in the Wal-Mart v. Dukes decision.320 Although there are certainly many
intellectual uses for envisioning alternative lines of jurisprudence, by contradicting
later firm precedent, this aspect of the Price Waterhouse rewrite is less useful for
future persuasive arguments. Again, political science would characterize this as a
displacement which is more difficult to instill.321
Some of the Tax FJP opinions also attempt to establish disparate impact
as a viable legal theory in contravention of existing precedent. For example, in
the rewritten Bob Jones University v. United States,322 Dean David Brennan’s
concurring opinion comes to the same outcome as the original opinion,323
specifically, that Bob Jones University is not entitled to §501(c)(3) status as a
charitable organization because its admissions policies violate public policy,324 but
offers different reasoning. The original opinion based this outcome on the fact that
the University’s admissions policies were, intentionally, racially discriminatory.325
Brennan finds the policies also violate public policy because they have a disparate
impact on women.326 To find that the admissions policy violated public policy, both
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the original opinion and the rewrite reviewed legislative, executive, and judicial
actions concerning discrimination to find evidence of public policy.327 Brennan’s
argument that gendered disparate impact as such a violation is contrary to
Washington v. Davis, and indeed (as the commentary on his opinion acknowledges)
to other cases indicating a mixed record on even intentional gender discrimination
at that time.328 Thus, while perhaps not requiring direct displacement of Washington
v. Davis, the rewritten opinion bases its argument on disparate impact as “public
policy,” a difficult premise to support.
The rewritten opinion in Estate of Clack v. Commissioner, similarly offers a
disparate impact theory as the basis for its opinion, acknowledging its likely lack
of support by writing as a dissent.329 In the original opinion, the Tax Court found
that a marital deduction was still possible even where an executor could divest a
surviving spouse of a property interest through qualified terminable interest property
(QTIP) elections.330 In the rewritten opinion, Professor Wendy Gerzog challenges
this holding for its reliance on gender stereotypes and disparate impact on women.331
As the commentary on the opinion acknowledges, it is embracing a disparate
impact theory rejected by Washington v. Davis, and indeed a number of other tax
related opinions.332 Nonetheless, the commentary argues for “the expressive force of
dissents,” asserting that “[p]erhaps Gerzog’s opinion could have set the stage for a
series of dissents over time point out the structural sexism, racism, and heterosexism
of the Code [which] could in turn have influenced public opinion.”333 Again, although
useful for theoretical and intellectual pursuits, this alternative history of law offers
less utility for crafting arguments to influence the current judiciary.

C. Alternative Methods of Persuasion
Overall, the above analysis identifies a category of FJP opinions engaged in
displacement, which offer less useful arguments for persuasion, and a category
of FJP decisions using PBD, which offers useful arguments for persuasion
but only to non-originalists jurists. This section explores a third category of rewritten FJP opinions that uses a perhaps more moderate approach, what has been
termed “ideational salience amplification” (ISA).334 ISA is a method of persuasion
available to those without dominant power who wish to push judicial outcomes
in a different direction.335 ISA is available because, typically, those within power
shape their decisions based on a wide range of ideas.336 With ISA, “[r]ather than
having to replace one set of established ideas with an alternative paradigm,
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emergent actors may simply amplify the salience of certain ideas that already exist
within the judicial field.”337 For example, conservative legal advocates used the
norm of color blindness, first developed to aid the historically disadvantaged, to
challenge affirmative action.338 ISA takes a more legalistic approach than PBD.
In PBD, existing precedent evolves to apply to new social facts; these facts play a
crucial role in the argument.339 With ISA, an existing legal principle receives greater
emphasis, and this legal argument drives the outcome.340
A number of FJP opinions tap into the process of ISA. For example, in the Tax
FJP, Professor Mary Louise Fellows re-wrote Welch v. Halvering341 and revived the
“necessary” prong of the existing ordinary and necessary business deduction test.342
In the original opinion, the Supreme Court did not emphasize the necessary factor
and deferred to the taxpayer’s view on this aspect.343 Professor Fellows removed
this deference, and provided a more critical path for reviewing purportedly
necessary deductions.344 By amplifying the salience of this factor, Professor Fellows
“avoid[ed] the original’s reflexive abdication of power to the already powerful,”
and critiques the acceptance of public related expenses as necessary and business
related while relegating others to “women’s” private sphere.345
In the rewritten opinion of Cheshire v. Commissioner, Professor Danshera
Cords, as a Tax Court judge, comes to the opposite conclusion as the original
opinion on the crucial issue of what level of knowledge removes the innocent
spouse defense to joint liability on a jointly filed married tax return.346 The original
opinion held that a married taxpayer was not entitled to innocent spouse relief if
the spouse knew of the transactions giving rise to the income underlying the tax
liability.347 In contrast, Cords finds innocent spouse relief is only removed where
the spouse has knowledge that the item is in fact taxable.348 Cords’ interpretation
relies on extensive analysis of the legislative history of the relevant innocent spouse
provision.349 As a feminist opinion, Cords discusses the gendered context of this tax
law, detailing the traditional gender roles women assume within marriage and how
that places them at particular risk from joint liability.350 Cords’ reasoning however,
is not dependent upon finding the law has a disparate impact on women, and instead
rests on giving greater ideational salience to the legislative history supporting her
legal test.351
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In some FJP opinions, the authors use ISA on the concept of stereotyping as
a form of gender discrimination.352 Courts, including the Supreme Court, have
long recognized a connection between stereotyping and discrimination.353 This
relatively non-controversial and accepted principle is therefore ripe for salience
amplification. For example, in the rewritten opinion of Rostker v. Goldberg,354
Professor David Cohen reverses the original opinion that had upheld the male
only registration for the military draft.355 Cohen’s opinion concludes that the draft
must apply to all, regardless of gender, refusing to adopt the original opinion’s
strong deference to the military.356 Instead, Cohen details and emphasizes the
extensive gender stereotypes behind the male-only rule and ties them into the antistereotyping principles the Court in Reed v. Reed,357 Frontiero v. Richardson,358
and Craig v. Boren.359
As these examples show, one of the techniques of the FJP is to persuade using
existing legal concepts to different effect. This ideational salience amplification
is quickly recognized by legal scholars as a classic form of argument; but it also
has the support of political science scholars who have studied theories of ideabased change. This field recognizes that an out-of-power group that seeks to
replace ideas altogether faces a more difficult path than one that takes the more
indirect path of enhancing the prominence of existing norms and values.360 Thus,
to the likely extent that originalist judges will not be receptive to PBD and the
displacement cases are contrary to existing precedent, ISA offers an alternative
path of persuasion.
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VI. Conclusion
As the above discussion demonstrates, any critique or analysis of the FJP must
be as multi-faced as the opinions themselves. Each FJP author seeks to infuse the
law with a feminist perspective, and was bound by existing precedent and facts
when doing so,361 but the outcomes and reasoning vary widely. A number of FJP
authors referenced underemphasized or altogether unrecognized facts and tied them
to existing law to construct an alternative argument.362 Historical institutionalism
describes this process as principle-based decision making.363 According to
institutionalist scholars, in previous cases, this method caused legal rules to evolve
in a progressive direction, even in a conservative court.364 These type of arguments
offered by the FJP offer some prospect of efficacy, except to the extent the deciding
judges are originalists,365 a perhaps daunting exception in the current climate. Some
FJP opinions engage in displacement, offering arguments that directly contradict
existing law, by imagining certain negative precedents would never come to be.366
Political science studies find that for out-of-power groups, this direct approach
is unlikely to succeed.367 Thus, these alternative timeline scenarios might be
intellectually stimulating, but offer less practical utility for constructing persuasive
legal arguments. Finally, in a number of opinions, the authors delve into the law to
construct arguments through ideational salience amplification.368 These highlight
existing legal principles to a greater degree or in slightly different ways than the
original opinion.369 Historical institutionalism finds this modest approach to have
persuasive potential.370 Overall, the mixed range of FJP opinions offer a mixed level
of utility for future arguments.
Looking beyond the type of arguments, where the FJP might find its greatest
utility is in its broader reach of jurisdictions and areas of law. Future FJP projects,
including employment discrimination and health law, will be able to emphasize
statutory and regulatory arguments rather than the constitutional arguments that
were necessarily part of the Supreme Court collection.371 Political science scholars
have found that in less controversial areas372 or those with clearer legal bases
such as statutory language,373 ideology will play less of a role in judicial decisionmaking. Moreover, the FJP plans to issue rewritten opinions in a number of fields
governed by state law.374 Although there are far fewer studies of state courts, their
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different political position suggests they might be less rigidly ideological.375 Thus,
the expansive reach of the FJP may hold the greatest promise for its ultimate effect
on the law.
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